Industroyer
Industroyer is a sophisticated piece of malware designed to cause an Impact to the working processes of Industrial Control Systems (ICS), specifically ICSs used in electrical substations.[1] Industroyer was alleged to be used in the attacks on the Ukrainian power grid in December 2016.[2]CitationCISA Alert (TA17-163A)[3][4]
This ATT&CK object is revoked or deprecated in the current MITRE ATT&CK release.
It remains available for historical context and inbound links. Use current ATT&CK relationships and replacement guidance before basing detection or reporting work on this page.
Analyst summary pending validation
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Industroyer
Industroyer is a sophisticated piece of malware designed to cause an Impact to the working processes of Industrial Control Systems (ICS), specifically ICSs used in electrical substations.[1] Industroyer was alleged to be used in the attacks on the Ukrainian power grid in December 2016.[2]CitationCISA Alert (TA17-163A)[3][4]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
All related ATT&CK context
No relationships are available in the current normalized data for this object.
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle Deprecated | 71ad87de30e5… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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[1]
ESET Win32/Industroyer
Anton Cherepanov, ESET. (2017, June 12). Win32/Industroyer: A new threat for industrial control systems. Retrieved September 15, 2017.
Open source URL -
[2]
Dragos Crashoverride
Dragos Inc.. (2017, June 13). Industroyer - Dragos - 201706: Analysis of the Threat to Electic Grid Operations. Retrieved September 18, 2017.
Open source URL -
[3]
Dragos Crashoverride 2018
Dragos. (2018, October 12). Anatomy of an Attack: Detecting and Defeating CRASHOVERRIDE. Retrieved October 14, 2019.
Open source URL -
[4]
Dragos Crashoverride 2019
Joe Slowik. (2019, August 15). CRASHOVERRIDE: Reassessing the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Event as a Protection-Focused Attack. Retrieved October 22, 2019.
Open source URL -
[5]
CISA Alert TA17-163A CrashOverride June 2017
CISA. (2017, June 12). Alert (TA17-163A). Retrieved October 22, 2019.
Open source URL -
[6]
mitre-ics-attack S1004Open source URL
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