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MITRE ATT&CK® Reference

Mitigations

ATT&CK mitigations and Glexia implementation context.

335 records · validated library

Mitigations results

Results are validated against normalized ATT&CK source records when available; sample records are used only in development or empty-data environments.

Mitigation Enterprise

T1093: Process Hollowing Mitigation

This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating specific API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software (i.e., security products) from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior.

Although process hollowing may be used to evade certain types of defenses, it is still good practice to identify potentially malicious software that may be used to perform adversarial actions and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting [1] tools, like AppLocker, [2] [3] or Software Restriction Policies [4] where appropriate. [5]

Revoked/deprecated
Mitigation Enterprise

T1012: Query Registry Mitigation

Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information within the Registry, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting [1] tools, like AppLocker, [2] [3] or Software Restriction Policies [4] where appropriate. [5]

Revoked/deprecated
Mitigation Enterprise

T1164: Re-opened Applications Mitigation

Holding the Shift key while logging in prevents apps from opening automatically [1]. This feature can be disabled entirely with the following terminal command: defaults write -g ApplePersistence -bool no.

Revoked/deprecated
Mitigation Enterprise

T1108: Redundant Access Mitigation

Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be used as a remote access tool, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting [1] tools, like AppLocker, [2] [3] or Software Restriction Policies [4] where appropriate. [5]

Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and will be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. [6]

Revoked/deprecated
Mitigation Enterprise

T1121: Regsvcs/Regasm Mitigation

Regsvcs and Regasm may not be necessary within a given environment. Block execution of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe if they are not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries.

Revoked/deprecated
Mitigation Enterprise

T1117: Regsvr32 Mitigation

Microsoft's Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) feature can be used to block regsvr32.exe from being used to bypass whitelisting. [1]

Revoked/deprecated
Mitigation Enterprise

T1219: Remote Access Tools Mitigation

Properly configure firewalls, application firewalls, and proxies to limit outgoing traffic to sites and services used by remote access tools.

Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures may be able to prevent traffic to these services as well.

Use application whitelisting to mitigate use of and installation of unapproved software.

Revoked/deprecated
Mitigation Enterprise

M1029: Remote Data Storage

Remote Data Storage focuses on moving critical data, such as security logs and sensitive files, to secure, off-host locations to minimize unauthorized access, tampering, or destruction by adversaries. By leveraging remote storage solutions, organizations enhance the protection of forensic evidence, sensitive information, and monitoring data. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Centralized Log Management:

- Configure endpoints to forward security logs to a centralized log collector or SIEM. - Use tools like Splunk Graylog, or Security Onion to aggregate and store logs. - Example command (Linux): `sudo auditd | tee /var/log/audit/audit.log | nc 514`

Remote File Storage Solutions:

- Utilize cloud storage solutions like AWS S3, Google Cloud Storage, or Azure Blob Storage for sensitive data. - Ensure proper encryption at rest and access control policies (IAM roles, ACLs).

Intrusion Detection Log Forwarding:

- Forward logs from IDS/IPS systems (e.g., Zeek/Suricata) to a remote security information system. - Example for Suricata log forwarding: `outputs: - type: syslog protocol: tls address: `

Immutable Backup Configurations:

- Enable immutable storage settings for backups to prevent adversaries from modifying or deleting data. - Example: AWS S3 Object Lock.

Data Encryption:

- Ensure encryption for sensitive data using AES-256 at rest and TLS 1.2+ for data in transit. Tools: OpenSSL, BitLocker, LUKS for Linux.

Mitigation Enterprise

T1076: Remote Desktop Protocol Mitigation

Disable the RDP service if it is unnecessary, remove unnecessary accounts and groups from Remote Desktop Users groups, and enable firewall rules to block RDP traffic between network security zones. Audit the Remote Desktop Users group membership regularly. Remove the local Administrators group from the list of groups allowed to log in through RDP. Limit remote user permissions if remote access is necessary. Use remote desktop gateways and multifactor authentication for remote logins. [1] Do not leave RDP accessible from the internet. Change GPOs to define shorter timeouts sessions and maximum amount of time any single session can be active. Change GPOs to specify the maximum amount of time that a disconnected session stays active on the RD session host server. [2]

Revoked/deprecated
Mitigation Enterprise

T1105: Remote File Copy Mitigation

Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware or unusual data transfer over known tools and protocols like FTP can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. [1]

Revoked/deprecated
Mitigation Enterprise

T1018: Remote System Discovery Mitigation

Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information on remotely available systems, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting [1] tools, like AppLocker, [2] [3] or Software Restriction Policies [4] where appropriate. [5]

Revoked/deprecated
Mitigation Enterprise

T1091: Replication Through Removable Media Mitigation

Disable Autorun if it is unnecessary. [1] Disallow or restrict removable media at an organizational policy level if it is not required for business operations. [2]

Identify potentially malicious software that may be used to infect removable media or may result from tainted removable media, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting [3] tools, like AppLocker, [4] [5] or Software Restriction Policies [6] where appropriate. [7]

Revoked/deprecated
Mitigation Enterprise

M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions

Restricting file and directory permissions involves setting access controls at the file system level to limit which users, groups, or processes can read, write, or execute files. By configuring permissions appropriately, organizations can reduce the attack surface for adversaries seeking to access sensitive data, plant malicious code, or tamper with system files.

Enforce Least Privilege Permissions:

- Remove unnecessary write permissions on sensitive files and directories. - Use file ownership and groups to control access for specific roles.

Example (Windows): Right-click the shared folder → Properties → Security tab → Adjust permissions for NTFS ACLs.

Harden File Shares:

- Disable anonymous access to shared folders. - Enforce NTFS permissions for shared folders on Windows.

Example: Set permissions to restrict write access to critical files, such as system executables (e.g., `/bin` or `/sbin` on Linux). Use tools like `chown` and `chmod` to assign file ownership and limit access.

On Linux, apply: `chmod 750 /etc/sensitive.conf` `chown root:admin /etc/sensitive.conf`

File Integrity Monitoring (FIM):

- Use tools like Tripwire, Wazuh, or OSSEC to monitor changes to critical file permissions.

Audit File System Access:

- Enable auditing to track permission changes or unauthorized access attempts. - Use auditd (Linux) or Event Viewer (Windows) to log activities.

Restrict Startup Directories:

- Configure permissions to prevent unauthorized writes to directories like `C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu`.

Example: Restrict write access to critical directories like `/etc/`, `/usr/local/`, and Windows directories such as `C:\Windows\System32`.

- On Windows, use icacls to modify permissions: `icacls "C:\Windows\System32" /inheritance:r /grant:r SYSTEM:(OI)(CI)F` - On Linux, monitor permissions using tools like `lsattr` or `auditd`.

Mitigation Enterprise

M1044: Restrict Library Loading

Restricting library loading involves implementing security controls to ensure that only trusted and verified libraries (DLLs, shared objects, etc.) are loaded into processes. Adversaries often abuse Dynamic-Link Library (DLL) Injection, DLL Search Order Hijacking, or LD_PRELOAD mechanisms to execute malicious code by forcing the operating system to load untrusted libraries. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Enforce Safe Library Loading Practices:

- Enable `SafeDLLSearchMode` on Windows. - Restrict `LD_PRELOAD` and `LD_LIBRARY_PATH` usage on Linux systems.

Code Signing Enforcement:

- Require digital signatures for all libraries loaded into processes. - Use tools like Signtool, and WDAC to enforce signed DLL execution.

Environment Hardening:

- Secure library paths and directories to prevent adversaries from placing rogue libraries. - Monitor user-writable directories and system configurations for unauthorized changes.

Audit and Monitor Library Loading:

- Enable `Sysmon` on Windows to monitor for suspicious library loads. - Use `auditd` on Linux to monitor shared library paths and configuration file changes.

Use Application Control Solutions:

- Implement AppLocker, WDAC, or SELinux to allow only trusted libraries.

*Tools for Implementation*

Windows-Specific Tools:

- AppLocker: Application whitelisting for DLLs. - Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC): Restrict unauthorized library execution. - Signtool: Verify and enforce code signing. - Sysmon: Monitor DLL load events (Event ID 7).

Linux-Specific Tools:

- auditd: Monitor changes to library paths and critical files. - SELinux/AppArmor: Define policies to restrict library loading. - ldconfig and chattr: Secure LD configuration files and prevent unauthorized modifications.

Cross-Platform Solutions:

- Wazuh or OSSEC: File integrity monitoring for library changes. - Tripwire: Detect and alert on unauthorized library modifications.

Mitigation ICS

M0944: Restrict Library Loading

Prevent abuse of library loading mechanisms in the operating system and software to load untrusted code by configuring appropriate library loading mechanisms and investigating potential vulnerable software.

Mitigation Enterprise

M1024: Restrict Registry Permissions

Restricting registry permissions involves configuring access control settings for sensitive registry keys and hives to ensure that only authorized users or processes can make modifications. By limiting access, organizations can prevent unauthorized changes that adversaries might use for persistence, privilege escalation, or defense evasion. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Review and Adjust Permissions on Critical Keys

- Regularly review permissions on keys such as `Run`, `RunOnce`, and `Services` to ensure only authorized users have write access. - Use tools like `icacls` or `PowerShell` to automate permission adjustments.

Enable Registry Auditing

- Enable auditing on sensitive keys to log access attempts. - Use Event Viewer or SIEM solutions to analyze logs and detect suspicious activity. - Example Audit Policy: `auditpol /set /subcategory:"Registry" /success:enable /failure:enable`

Protect Credential-Related Hives

- Limit access to hives like `SAM`,`SECURITY`, and `SYSTEM` to prevent credential dumping or other unauthorized access. - Use LSA Protection to add an additional security layer for credential storage.

Restrict Registry Editor Usage

- Use Group Policy to restrict access to regedit.exe for non-administrative users. - Block execution of registry editing tools on endpoints where they are unnecessary.

Deploy Baseline Configuration Tools

- Use tools like Microsoft Security Compliance Toolkit or CIS Benchmarks to apply and maintain secure registry configurations.

*Tools for Implementation*

Registry Permission Tools:

- Registry Editor (regedit): Built-in tool to manage registry permissions. - PowerShell: Automate permissions and manage keys. `Set-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" -Name "KeyName" -Value "Value"` - icacls: Command-line tool to modify ACLs.

Monitoring Tools:

- Sysmon: Monitor and log registry events. - Event Viewer: View registry access logs.

Policy Management Tools:

- Group Policy Management Console (GPMC): Enforce registry permissions via GPOs. - Microsoft Endpoint Manager: Deploy configuration baselines for registry permissions.

Mitigation Enterprise

M1021: Restrict Web-Based Content

Restricting web-based content involves enforcing policies and technologies that limit access to potentially malicious websites, unsafe downloads, and unauthorized browser behaviors. This can include URL filtering, download restrictions, script blocking, and extension control to protect against exploitation, phishing, and malware delivery. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Deploy Web Proxy Filtering:

- Use solutions to filter web traffic based on categories, reputation, and content types. - Enforce policies that block unsafe websites or file types at the gateway level.

Enable DNS-Based Filtering:

- Implement tools to restrict access to domains associated with malware or phishing campaigns. - Use public DNS filtering services to enhance protection.

Enforce Content Security Policies (CSP):

- Configure CSP headers on internal and external web applications to restrict script execution, iframe embedding, and cross-origin requests.

Control Browser Features:

- Disable unapproved browser features like automatic downloads, developer tools, or unsafe scripting. - Enforce policies through tools like Group Policy Management to control browser settings.

Monitor and Alert on Web-Based Threats:

- Use SIEM tools to collect and analyze web proxy logs for signs of anomalous or malicious activity. - Configure alerts for access attempts to blocked domains or repeated file download failures.

Mitigation Enterprise

T1014: Rootkit Mitigation

Identify potentially malicious software that may contain rootkit functionality, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting [1] tools, like AppLocker, [2] [3] or Software Restriction Policies [4] where appropriate. [5]

Revoked/deprecated
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.