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MITRE ATT&CK® Mitigation

T1500: Compile After Delivery Mitigation

This type of technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls or patched since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, blocking all file compilation may have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate OS frameworks and code development mechanisms from operating properly. Consider removing compilers if not needed, otherwise efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior.

Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to decrypt, deobfuscate, decode, and compile files or information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting [1] tools, like AppLocker, [2] [3] or Software Restriction Policies [4] where appropriate. [5]

EnterpriseT1500MitigationObject v1.0 Modified
Historical object

This ATT&CK object is revoked or deprecated in the current MITRE ATT&CK release.

It remains available for historical context and inbound links. Use current ATT&CK relationships and replacement guidance before basing detection or reporting work on this page.

Glexia's Take

Analyst summary pending validation

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Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Compile After Delivery Mitigation

This type of technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls or patched since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, blocking all file compilation may have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate OS frameworks and code development mechanisms from operating properly. Consider removing compilers if not needed, otherwise efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior.

Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to decrypt, deobfuscate, decode, and compile files or information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting [1] tools, like AppLocker, [2] [3] or Software Restriction Policies [4] where appropriate. [5]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

No relationships are available in the current normalized data for this object.

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
8ff10de2803f41b5...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
Release Bundle imported Object version Modified Status Raw hash
19.1 1.0 Current bundle Deprecated 8ff10de2803f…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Beechey 2010

    Beechey, J. (2010, December). Application Whitelisting: Panacea or Propaganda?. Retrieved November 18, 2014.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Windows Commands JPCERT

    Tomonaga, S. (2016, January 26). Windows Commands Abused by Attackers. Retrieved February 2, 2016.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    NSA MS AppLocker

    NSA Information Assurance Directorate. (2014, August). Application Whitelisting Using Microsoft AppLocker. Retrieved March 31, 2016.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Corio 2008

    Corio, C., & Sayana, D. P. (2008, June). Application Lockdown with Software Restriction Policies. Retrieved November 18, 2014.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    TechNet Applocker vs SRP

    Microsoft. (2012, June 27). Using Software Restriction Policies and AppLocker Policies. Retrieved April 7, 2016.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    mitre-attack T1500
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.