T1208: Kerberoasting Mitigation
Ensure strong password length (ideally 25+ characters) and complexity for service accounts and that these passwords periodically expire. [1] Also consider using Group Managed Service Accounts or another third party product such as password vaulting. [1]
Limit service accounts to minimal required privileges, including membership in privileged groups such as Domain Administrators. [1]
Enable AES Kerberos encryption (or another stronger encryption algorithm), rather than RC4, where possible. [1]
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Kerberoasting Mitigation
Ensure strong password length (ideally 25+ characters) and complexity for service accounts and that these passwords periodically expire. [1] Also consider using Group Managed Service Accounts or another third party product such as password vaulting. [1]
Limit service accounts to minimal required privileges, including membership in privileged groups such as Domain Administrators. [1]
Enable AES Kerberos encryption (or another stronger encryption algorithm), rather than RC4, where possible. [1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
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Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle Deprecated | d267274af25a… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
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External references and citations
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[1]
AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015
Metcalf, S. (2015, December 31). Cracking Kerberos TGS Tickets Using Kerberoast – Exploiting Kerberos to Compromise the Active Directory Domain. Retrieved March 22, 2018.
Open source URL -
[2]
mitre-attack T1208Open source URL
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