T1189: Drive-by Compromise Mitigation
Drive-by compromise relies on there being a vulnerable piece of software on the client end systems. Use modern browsers with security features turned on. Ensure all browsers and plugins kept updated can help prevent the exploit phase of this technique.
For malicious code served up through ads, adblockers can help prevent that code from executing in the first place. Script blocking extensions can help prevent the execution of JavaScript that may commonly be used during the exploitation process.
Browser sandboxes can be used to mitigate some of the impact of exploitation, but sandbox escapes may still exist. [1] [2]
Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of client-side exploitation. The risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in implementation may still exist. [2]
Security applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. [3] Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. [4] Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility.
This ATT&CK object is revoked or deprecated in the current MITRE ATT&CK release.
It remains available for historical context and inbound links. Use current ATT&CK relationships and replacement guidance before basing detection or reporting work on this page.
Analyst summary pending validation
Glexia publishes ATT&CK takes only after source-hash and schema validation. Until then, use the official MITRE definition below and the defensive relationship context on this page.
Drive-by Compromise Mitigation
Drive-by compromise relies on there being a vulnerable piece of software on the client end systems. Use modern browsers with security features turned on. Ensure all browsers and plugins kept updated can help prevent the exploit phase of this technique.
For malicious code served up through ads, adblockers can help prevent that code from executing in the first place. Script blocking extensions can help prevent the execution of JavaScript that may commonly be used during the exploitation process.
Browser sandboxes can be used to mitigate some of the impact of exploitation, but sandbox escapes may still exist. [1] [2]
Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of client-side exploitation. The risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in implementation may still exist. [2]
Security applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. [3] Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. [4] Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
All related ATT&CK context
No relationships are available in the current normalized data for this object.
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle Deprecated | 38c77085aa14… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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[1]
Windows Blogs Microsoft Edge Sandbox
Cowan, C. (2017, March 23). Strengthening the Microsoft Edge Sandbox. Retrieved March 12, 2018.
Open source URL -
[2]
Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape
Goodin, D. (2017, March 17). Virtual machine escape fetches $105,000 at Pwn2Own hacking contest - updated. Retrieved March 12, 2018.
Open source URL -
[3]
TechNet Moving Beyond EMET
Nunez, N. (2017, August 9). Moving Beyond EMET II – Windows Defender Exploit Guard. Retrieved March 12, 2018.
Open source URL -
[4]
Wikipedia Control Flow Integrity
Wikipedia. (2018, January 11). Control-flow integrity. Retrieved March 12, 2018.
Open source URL -
[5]
mitre-attack T1189Open source URL
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