T1078: Valid Accounts Mitigation
Take measures to detect or prevent techniques such as OS Credential Dumping or installation of keyloggers to acquire credentials through Input Capture. Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent access if account credentials are obtained. Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network. Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups across systems unless they are tightly controlled and use of accounts is segmented, as this is often equivalent to having a local administrator account with the same password on all systems.
Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers. [1]
Audit domain and local accounts as well as their permission levels routinely to look for situations that could allow an adversary to gain wide access by obtaining credentials of a privileged account. [2] [3] These audits should also include if default accounts have been enabled, or if new local accounts are created that have not be authorized.
Applications and appliances that utilize default username and password should be changed immediately after the installation, and before deployment to a production environment. [4] When possible, applications that use SSH keys should be updated periodically and properly secured.
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Valid Accounts Mitigation
Take measures to detect or prevent techniques such as OS Credential Dumping or installation of keyloggers to acquire credentials through Input Capture. Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent access if account credentials are obtained. Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network. Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups across systems unless they are tightly controlled and use of accounts is segmented, as this is often equivalent to having a local administrator account with the same password on all systems.
Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers. [1]
Audit domain and local accounts as well as their permission levels routinely to look for situations that could allow an adversary to gain wide access by obtaining credentials of a privileged account. [2] [3] These audits should also include if default accounts have been enabled, or if new local accounts are created that have not be authorized.
Applications and appliances that utilize default username and password should be changed immediately after the installation, and before deployment to a production environment. [4] When possible, applications that use SSH keys should be updated periodically and properly secured.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
All related ATT&CK context
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Object version and sync metadata
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Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle Deprecated | 1d8c414c9b2c… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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[1]
Microsoft Securing Privileged Access
Plett, C., Poggemeyer, L. (12, October 26). Securing Privileged Access Reference Material. Retrieved April 25, 2017.
Open source URL -
[2]
TechNet Credential Theft
Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Attractive Accounts for Credential Theft. Retrieved June 3, 2016.
Open source URL -
[3]
TechNet Least Privilege
Microsoft. (2016, April 16). Implementing Least-Privilege Administrative Models. Retrieved June 3, 2016.
Open source URL -
[4]
US-CERT Alert TA13-175A Risks of Default Passwords on the Internet
US-CERT. (n.d.). Risks of Default Passwords on the Internet. Retrieved April 12, 2019.
Open source URL -
[5]
mitre-attack T1078Open source URL
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