T1034: Path Interception Mitigation
Eliminate path interception weaknesses in program configuration files, scripts, the PATH environment variable, services, and in shortcuts by surrounding PATH variables with quotation marks when functions allow for them [1]. Be aware of the search order Windows uses for executing or loading binaries and use fully qualified paths wherever appropriate [2]. Clean up old Windows Registry keys when software is uninstalled to avoid keys with no associated legitimate binaries.
Periodically search for and correct or report path interception weaknesses on systems that may have been introduced using custom or available tools that report software using insecure path configurations [3].
Require that all executables be placed in write-protected directories. Ensure that proper permissions and directory access control are set to deny users the ability to write files to the top-level directory C: and system directories, such as C:\Windows\, to reduce places where malicious files could be placed for execution.
Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through the path interception by using whitelisting [4] tools, like AppLocker [5] [6] or Software Restriction Policies, [7] that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown executables.
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Path Interception Mitigation
Eliminate path interception weaknesses in program configuration files, scripts, the PATH environment variable, services, and in shortcuts by surrounding PATH variables with quotation marks when functions allow for them [1]. Be aware of the search order Windows uses for executing or loading binaries and use fully qualified paths wherever appropriate [2]. Clean up old Windows Registry keys when software is uninstalled to avoid keys with no associated legitimate binaries.
Periodically search for and correct or report path interception weaknesses on systems that may have been introduced using custom or available tools that report software using insecure path configurations [3].
Require that all executables be placed in write-protected directories. Ensure that proper permissions and directory access control are set to deny users the ability to write files to the top-level directory C: and system directories, such as C:\Windows\, to reduce places where malicious files could be placed for execution.
Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through the path interception by using whitelisting [4] tools, like AppLocker [5] [6] or Software Restriction Policies, [7] that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown executables.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
All related ATT&CK context
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Object version and sync metadata
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Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle Deprecated | 8b4e5e4dd84f… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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[1]
Microsoft CreateProcess
Microsoft. (n.d.). CreateProcess function. Retrieved December 5, 2014.
Open source URL -
[2]
MSDN DLL Security
Microsoft. (n.d.). Dynamic-Link Library Security. Retrieved July 25, 2016.
Open source URL -
[3]
Kanthak Sentinel
Kanthak, S. (2016, July 20). Vulnerability and Exploit Detector. Retrieved February 3, 2017.
Open source URL -
[4]
Beechey 2010
Beechey, J. (2010, December). Application Whitelisting: Panacea or Propaganda?. Retrieved November 18, 2014.
Open source URL -
[5]
Windows Commands JPCERT
Tomonaga, S. (2016, January 26). Windows Commands Abused by Attackers. Retrieved February 2, 2016.
Open source URL -
[6]
NSA MS AppLocker
NSA Information Assurance Directorate. (2014, August). Application Whitelisting Using Microsoft AppLocker. Retrieved March 31, 2016.
Open source URL -
[7]
Corio 2008
Corio, C., & Sayana, D. P. (2008, June). Application Lockdown with Software Restriction Policies. Retrieved November 18, 2014.
Open source URL -
[8]
mitre-attack T1034Open source URL
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