DET0895: Detection of Acquire Infrastructure
DET0895 is a detection strategy object for identifying activity related to ATT&CK T1583, Acquire Infrastructure. Its business value is early warning: adver...
Analyst context for executives and security teams
DET0895 is a detection strategy object for identifying activity related to ATT&CK T1583, Acquire Infrastructure. Its business value is early warning: adversaries often prepare domains, servers, cloud resources, or third-party services before intrusion activity becomes visible in endpoint or network alerts. Because the supplied ATT&CK object has no official detection text or platform detail, this should be treated as a planning anchor rather than a ready-to-deploy analytic.
Executive priority
Prioritize this as a resilience and readiness question: does the organization have a way to notice adversary-owned infrastructure before it is used against the business, and can that evidence support incident decisions, threat intelligence enrichment, and compliance reporting? Leaders should ask whether SOC, threat intelligence, cloud security, and incident response teams share infrastructure indicators and whether budget is assigned to external-facing monitoring, enrichment, and response workflows rather than relying only on post-compromise telemetry.
Technical view
The object detects T1583 Acquire Infrastructure, which is under resource development and uses the PRE platform context in the supplied relationship. Since no official detection logic is provided, SOC and detection engineering teams should validate whether they can observe or enrich suspicious domains, servers, cloud-hosted assets, third-party web services, free-trial infrastructure, and other externally acquired resources when they become relevant to targeting. Treat detections as intelligence-led correlation and risk scoring rather than a single deterministic alert.
Likely telemetry
- Threat intelligence feeds and infrastructure reputation data
- DNS registration, passive DNS, and domain age/enrichment data
- Certificate transparency and TLS certificate metadata
- Network security logs showing connections to newly observed or suspicious infrastructure
- Proxy, web gateway, and DNS resolver logs
Detection direction
- Map existing detections and enrichment workflows to T1583 rather than assuming DET0895 provides deployable logic.
- Validate visibility into newly registered domains, leased or cloud-hosted servers, third-party web services, and other infrastructure types described in the related ATT&CK technique.
- Tune for context: newly created infrastructure alone can be benign, so prioritize correlation with targeting, suspicious naming, reputation changes, certificate patterns, DNS behavior, or observed connections from enterprise assets.
- Check blind spots where telemetry is commonly incomplete, including unmanaged DNS resolution, encrypted traffic without metadata capture, limited passive DNS access, and lack of external infrastructure enrichment.
- Ensure alerts can be handed to incident response with enough evidence to support blocking, monitoring, or threat hunting decisions.
Mitigation priorities
- Establish governance for threat intelligence ingestion, indicator validation, and expiry so infrastructure-based decisions remain current.
- Ensure DNS, proxy, network, and relevant external intelligence sources are retained and searchable for investigations.
- Define response playbooks for suspicious external infrastructure, including when to monitor, block, enrich, or escalate.
- Integrate infrastructure indicators into SOC workflows and incident response case management to preserve audit evidence and decision rationale.
- Review coverage periodically against T1583 because this detection strategy has no official ATT&CK detection procedure or platform-specific implementation guidance.
Analyst notes and limits
This take is based on the detection strategy DET0895 and its relationship to T1583 Acquire Infrastructure. The relationship indicates a resource-development, PRE-context behavior involving adversaries obtaining infrastructure such as servers, domains, cloud resources, and third-party web services. The practical value is earlier identification and enrichment of infrastructure that may later be used in targeting.
The supplied ATT&CK object provides no official description, no official detection text, no tactics, and no platforms for the detection strategy itself. Recommendations therefore remain high-level and must be validated against local telemetry, legal/privacy constraints, intelligence sources, and response processes. No active exploitation, attribution, or guaranteed detection coverage is implied.
Detection of Acquire Infrastructure
No official description is available in the imported ATT&CK source object.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1583 | Acquire Infrastructure | This object detects Acquire Infrastructure. |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 32c0346b3906… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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mitre-attack DET0895Open source URL
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