DET0892: Detection of Domains
DET0892 is a detection strategy placeholder for identifying adversary-controlled or suspicious domains associated with the ATT&CK Domains technique (T1583....
Analyst context for executives and security teams
DET0892 is a detection strategy placeholder for identifying adversary-controlled or suspicious domains associated with the ATT&CK Domains technique (T1583.001). The business value is early warning: domains are often prepared before phishing, drive-by compromise, or command-and-control activity, so monitoring them can help organizations act before an intrusion becomes operationally disruptive.
Executive priority
Treat this as a pre-incident resilience and readiness control, not just a SOC alert type. Leaders should ask whether the organization can discover suspicious domain infrastructure relevant to its users, brands, suppliers, and high-risk business processes before those domains are used in phishing, web compromise, or C2. Because the official ATT&CK object provides no detection logic or platform scope, priority should be on validating actual visibility, ownership, escalation paths, and evidence suitable for incident response and compliance reporting.
Technical view
This detection strategy detects T1583.001 Domains, which is in the resource-development tactic and PRE platform context. SOC and detection teams should validate domain-focused monitoring that can identify newly acquired or suspicious domains before or during targeting activity. Since ATT&CK provides no official detection text for DET0892, teams should not assume coverage from this object alone; they should document their own analytics, thresholds, enrichment sources, and response playbooks for domain acquisition and use cases tied to phishing, drive-by compromise, and command-and-control preparation.
Likely telemetry
- Domain registration, WHOIS, or RDAP records where available
- Passive DNS and DNS resolution history
- Certificate transparency or certificate issuance records
- Web proxy, secure web gateway, and DNS security logs
- Email security telemetry involving links, sender domains, and landing domains
Detection direction
- Validate whether monitoring covers the PRE/resource-development stage rather than only post-compromise endpoint or network activity.
- Correlate domain age, registration changes, DNS resolution, certificate issuance, and appearance in email or web traffic where those data sources are available.
- Tune carefully for false positives from legitimate new domains, marketing campaigns, mergers, cloud services, and third-party business activity.
- Avoid relying only on blocklists; newly acquired domains may have little or no reputation history.
- Document how domain findings are triaged, enriched, escalated, and connected to phishing, drive-by compromise, or command-and-control investigations.
Mitigation priorities
- Establish domain monitoring requirements for high-value brands, executive names, critical services, and business units exposed to phishing risk.
- Maintain response workflows for suspicious domains, including investigation ownership, evidence preservation, user protection, and escalation.
- Ensure email, DNS, and web controls can consume domain intelligence and apply policy decisions where appropriate.
- Use findings to inform awareness, incident response exercises, and control validation rather than treating domain discovery as a standalone alert.
- Review logging retention and enrichment sources so investigators can determine when a domain first appeared and whether users interacted with it.
Analyst notes and limits
The supplied ATT&CK object is sparse: it has no official description, no official detection text, no tactics, and no platforms of its own. The main decision value comes from its relationship to T1583.001 Domains, which describes adversaries acquiring domains for potential phishing, drive-by compromise, and command-and-control use.
This take does not assert active exploitation, attribution, guaranteed detection, or specific platform coverage. Local telemetry, business context, domain exposure, and control architecture are required to determine whether DET0892 is meaningfully implemented in a given environment.
Detection of Domains
No official description is available in the imported ATT&CK source object.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 47bc7adfc27e… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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mitre-attack DET0892Open source URL
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