DET0826: Detection of Gather Victim Host Information
DET0826 is a MITRE ATT&CK detection strategy for identifying attempts to gather information about a victim’s hosts before an intrusion. For security leader...
Analyst context for executives and security teams
DET0826 is a MITRE ATT&CK detection strategy for identifying attempts to gather information about a victim’s hosts before an intrusion. For security leaders, the value is early warning: host inventory, naming, IP assignment, operating system, language, role, and configuration details can help an adversary target the right systems and tailor later activity. Because the detection strategy itself has no official detection text or platform scope supplied, teams should treat it as a prompt to validate reconnaissance visibility rather than as a ready-made analytic.
Executive priority
Prioritize this as an exposure-management and resilience question: can the organization see when host details are being collected or exposed before compromise? This matters for incident triage, vulnerability prioritization, asset governance, and audit evidence because weak host inventory controls and limited reconnaissance telemetry can leave defenders blind to early targeting. Leaders should ask whether SOC, threat intelligence, vulnerability management, and asset management teams share enough evidence to identify unusual interest in critical hosts before follow-on activity occurs.
Technical view
This object detects ATT&CK T1592, Gather Victim Host Information, which is associated with reconnaissance and PRE platform context. Since DET0826 does not provide official detection logic, detection engineers should map local telemetry to the related behavior: attempts to enumerate or infer host names, assigned IPs, system roles, operating systems, language settings, or configuration details. Validation should focus on whether externally visible infrastructure, internet-facing services, DNS, certificates, scanning logs, web access logs, and threat intelligence sources can show unusual collection against host metadata. SOC and IR teams should correlate this with related reconnaissance patterns, especially where host information gathering appears near active scanning or phishing-for-information context referenced by the related technique description.
Likely telemetry
- External attack surface and asset inventory records
- DNS records and query logs where available
- Internet-facing web, proxy, and application access logs
- Firewall, IDS/IPS, and network sensor logs showing reconnaissance-like access patterns
- Vulnerability scanner and exposure management findings for host-identifying banners or metadata
Detection direction
- Confirm which host-identifying data is externally visible and whether the SOC receives alerts or reports when that exposure changes.
- Tune for unusual or repeated collection of host metadata rather than normal administrative inventory activity.
- Separate authorized vulnerability scanning, asset discovery, and monitoring from unknown external reconnaissance to reduce false positives.
- Correlate host-information gathering with other reconnaissance signals, including active scanning or information-seeking interactions when available.
- Document blind spots caused by missing perimeter logs, unmanaged assets, public cloud metadata exposure, or asset inventories that are not integrated with SOC workflows.
Mitigation priorities
- Maintain an accurate asset inventory and classify critical hosts so reconnaissance against high-value systems can be prioritized.
- Reduce unnecessary public exposure of host names, banners, configuration details, and other metadata that reveal system role or technology stack.
- Ensure authorized scanning and asset discovery are clearly tagged so defenders can distinguish expected activity from suspicious collection.
- Integrate attack surface management, vulnerability management, and SOC telemetry to support early reconnaissance triage.
- Use incident response playbooks that define when host-information gathering should trigger enrichment, owner notification, or containment planning.
Analyst notes and limits
The supplied ATT&CK object is a detection strategy with no official description, no official detection text, no tactics, and no platforms of its own. The practical interpretation comes from its relationship to T1592, Gather Victim Host Information, in the reconnaissance tactic with PRE platform context. Any operational detection must be built and tested against the organization’s actual exposure, logging, and authorized scanning patterns.
This take does not assert active exploitation, attribution, specific affected platforms, or guaranteed detection coverage. MITRE supplied no detection logic for DET0826, so implementation details require local telemetry, asset context, and risk decisions.
Detection of Gather Victim Host Information
No official description is available in the imported ATT&CK source object.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1592 | Gather Victim Host Information | This object detects Gather Victim Host Information. |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 1d288b2d3fb8… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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mitre-attack DET0826Open source URL
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