DET0813: Detection of Credentials
This detection strategy is about recognizing when adversaries are trying to collect credentials during pre-compromise reconnaissance. For business leaders,...
Analyst context for executives and security teams
This detection strategy is about recognizing when adversaries are trying to collect credentials during pre-compromise reconnaissance. For business leaders, the key value is early warning: credential exposure before an intrusion can weaken identity controls, increase phishing risk, and create avoidable incident response pressure even when no endpoint compromise has occurred.
Executive priority
Prioritize this as an identity and resilience issue, not only a SOC alerting problem. Leaders should ask whether the organization can discover credential exposure or credential-seeking activity early enough to drive password resets, user notification, phishing response, and audit evidence. Because the ATT&CK object provides no platform-specific or official detection guidance, investment decisions should focus on validating existing identity, threat intelligence, phishing, and exposed-credential processes rather than assuming a single tool provides coverage.
Technical view
The only explicit ATT&CK relationship is that DET0813 detects T1589.001 Credentials, a reconnaissance technique involving adversary collection of credentials that may belong to the victim organization or reused from personal accounts. SOC, detection engineering, and IR teams should treat this as a pre-intrusion detection and validation area: confirm what evidence exists for exposed credentials, phishing-for-information indicators, credential reuse risk, and suspicious activity around accounts before confirmed compromise. Since no tactics, platforms, official description, or official detection logic are supplied for DET0813 itself, detection design must be grounded in local telemetry and the related reconnaissance context.
Likely telemetry
- Identity provider and authentication logs showing unusual account activity or reset events
- Phishing reports and email/security gateway evidence related to credential collection attempts
- Threat intelligence or exposed-credential monitoring outputs, where available
- User-reported suspicious requests for credentials or account verification
- Case management and incident response records tying credential exposure to containment actions
Detection direction
- Validate whether current monitoring can surface credential exposure before successful login or endpoint compromise.
- Correlate exposed-credential findings with authentication attempts, password reset activity, phishing reports, and account risk signals.
- Tune triage to distinguish confirmed organizational credentials from unrelated lookalike, stale, personal, or unverified credential dumps.
- Document blind spots where credential collection may occur outside enterprise-controlled platforms, especially because the related technique is PRE/reconnaissance.
- Use the relationship to T1589.001 as the detection scope; do not infer broader credential theft coverage without separate ATT&CK mappings and telemetry.
Mitigation priorities
- Establish clear intake and triage for suspected exposed credentials and credential-harvesting reports.
- Prioritize rapid containment workflows such as account review, password reset, session/token review, and user notification where local policy supports them.
- Strengthen identity controls and user reporting processes that reduce the business impact of credential reuse and phishing-for-information.
- Ensure compliance and audit teams can show evidence of credential exposure handling, escalation, and closure.
- Review gaps between threat intelligence, SOC monitoring, identity operations, and incident response so pre-compromise findings do not remain unactioned.
Analyst notes and limits
This ATT&CK detection strategy record is sparse: it has a name, external reference, and one detects relationship to T1589.001 Credentials. The relationship makes the practical focus reconnaissance-stage credential collection, not confirmed credential theft inside an environment. Glexia’s interpretation is therefore framed around validation questions and operational readiness rather than specific analytics.
No official description, official detection text, tactics, platforms, aliases, or labels are provided for DET0813. The related technique has PRE platform and reconnaissance tactic context, but that applies to T1589.001 rather than to the detection strategy object itself. Local telemetry, identity architecture, and credential exposure processes are required to determine actual coverage.
Detection of Credentials
No official description is available in the imported ATT&CK source object.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1589.001 | Credentials Sub-technique | This object detects Credentials. |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 9437b7aabeb6… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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mitre-attack DET0813Open source URL
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