DET0792: Detection of Rogue Master
DET0792 is a detection strategy for identifying a Rogue Master in an ICS environment. The business issue is that a system impersonating or replacing a legi...
Analyst context for executives and security teams
DET0792 is a detection strategy for identifying a Rogue Master in an ICS environment. The business issue is that a system impersonating or replacing a legitimate control master could send apparently valid control messages to outstations or intercept traffic intended for the real master, creating risk to process reliability and incident visibility.
Executive priority
Treat this as an operational resilience and cyber-physical risk question: can the organization prove which systems are authorized to act as control masters, and can the SOC or OT operations team recognize when that role changes unexpectedly? Because the ATT&CK object provides no platform or detection detail, leaders should prioritize evidence of architecture ownership, monitoring coverage, and incident decision paths rather than assuming a tool already detects it.
Technical view
This detection strategy is linked to ICS technique T0848, Rogue Master. SOC, OT, and IR teams should validate whether monitoring can distinguish authorized master-to-outstation communications from unexpected systems performing master-like functions. Since MITRE supplies no official detection logic, platform list, or tactic mapping for DET0792, detection engineering should be based on local ICS topology, approved master asset inventory, expected communication paths, and observed control-server behavior.
Likely telemetry
- Authoritative inventory of legitimate ICS master/control server assets
- Network traffic between masters, outstations, and control system devices
- Source and destination addressing for control communications
- Protocol-aware ICS network observations where available
- Change records for control server configuration, routing, or communications paths
Detection direction
- Validate that monitoring can identify unexpected devices communicating with outstations as if they were a master.
- Baseline legitimate master-to-outstation communication paths and alert on new sources, unusual routing, or role changes.
- Tune detections with OT engineering input to reduce false positives from maintenance, failover, testing, or approved commissioning activity.
- Check for blind spots where traffic is not monitored, is only visible at aggregate network layers, or lacks protocol context needed to distinguish master behavior.
- Use the relationship to T0848 as the analytic anchor; do not infer coverage from DET0792 alone because no official detection text is supplied.
Mitigation priorities
- Maintain and review an approved inventory of systems authorized to perform master/control-server functions.
- Segment and restrict communications so only authorized masters can reach outstations where feasible.
- Require change control and operational approval for master role changes, failover paths, and control communications updates.
- Ensure OT incident response procedures include validation of master legitimacy and communication redirection scenarios.
- Preserve network and configuration evidence needed for compliance, post-incident review, and operational recovery decisions.
Analyst notes and limits
The key defensive value is not a specific signature; it is the ability to prove authority and expected behavior for ICS master communications. This is especially relevant for managed detection, incident response, OT security consulting, and cyber-physical resilience planning where asset role clarity and telemetry placement determine whether suspicious master behavior can be investigated.
The supplied ATT&CK detection strategy has no official description, no official detection text, no specified platforms, and no tactic mapping. The related Rogue Master technique description is the primary source for this take. Local architecture, protocols, asset roles, and monitoring placement are required before creating reliable detections or control priorities.
Detection of Rogue Master
No official description is available in the imported ATT&CK source object.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| ICS | T0848 | Rogue Master | This object detects Rogue Master. |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | dad1e9a8fc22… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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mitre-attack DET0792Open source URL
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