DET0783: Detection of Modify Program
DET0783 is a MITRE ATT&CK for ICS detection strategy for identifying Modify Program behavior: unauthorized or unexpected changes to controller logic that c...
Analyst context for executives and security teams
DET0783 is a MITRE ATT&CK for ICS detection strategy for identifying Modify Program behavior: unauthorized or unexpected changes to controller logic that can alter how industrial equipment interacts with a physical process, devices, or networked hosts. For leaders, the value is not just “detect a change,” but proving that the organization can tell the difference between approved engineering work and potentially unsafe controller program modification.
Executive priority
Prioritize this as an operational resilience and cyber-physical risk question: can the business verify who changed controller logic, when it changed, whether it was authorized, and whether the resulting process behavior remains safe? Because the supplied ATT&CK object has no official detection text, platforms, or tactics, executives should treat DET0783 as a validation prompt for ICS change governance, monitoring coverage, incident response readiness, and audit evidence around controller program integrity.
Technical view
SOC, OT, and IR teams should validate detection coverage around the related ICS technique T0889 Modify Program. Focus on evidence of controller program additions or modifications, including program downloads, online edits, program appends, and changes to Program Organization Units or logic. Since MITRE provides no detection procedure for DET0783, teams should map this strategy to local controller types, engineering workstation workflows, approved maintenance windows, change tickets, and known-good controller logic baselines.
Likely telemetry
- Controller or PLC program change events where available
- Engineering workstation activity related to program download, online edit, or program append operations
- Controller project/version metadata and logic comparison outputs
- Change-management records and maintenance-window approvals
- Authentication and user activity records for engineering tools and OT access paths
Detection direction
- Correlate controller program change indicators with approved work orders, maintenance windows, and named engineering personnel.
- Tune for unauthorized, out-of-window, unexpected, or unexplained logic changes rather than treating every program modification as malicious.
- Validate whether monitoring can distinguish read-only engineering activity from actual logic modification or download activity.
- Compare current controller logic against trusted baselines and investigate drift that lacks documented approval.
- Account for common blind spots: limited controller audit logging, engineering tools not forwarding logs, lack of known-good logic baselines, and OT network segments not visible to SOC tooling.
Mitigation priorities
- Establish or verify formal change control for controller logic modifications, including approval, timing, implementer identity, and rollback expectations.
- Maintain trusted backups or baselines of controller programs so changes can be compared and restored during incident response.
- Restrict and review access to engineering workstations, programming software, and OT pathways used to modify controller logic.
- Ensure OT incident response playbooks include steps for validating controller logic integrity and coordinating with engineering and operations staff.
- Collect and retain the telemetry needed to support investigations and compliance evidence for controller program changes.
Analyst notes and limits
The supplied ATT&CK object is a detection strategy with no official description, no official detection guidance, no listed platforms, and no tactics. The only behavioral context provided is the detects relationship to ICS technique T0889 Modify Program. This Glexia take therefore frames DET0783 as a defensive validation and governance topic for controller logic changes rather than a specific analytic with defined data sources or detection logic.
Coverage requirements depend heavily on the local ICS environment, controller models, engineering software, logging capabilities, network visibility, and change-management maturity. The provided fields do not support claims about active exploitation, adversary attribution, affected platforms, guaranteed detection, or specific tool behavior.
Detection of Modify Program
No official description is available in the imported ATT&CK source object.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| ICS | T0889 | Modify Program | This object detects Modify Program. |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 2e8914d277a6… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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mitre-attack DET0783Open source URL
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