DET0776: Detection of Modify Parameter
DET0776 is a detection strategy entry for identifying ICS behavior related to Modify Parameter (T0836). The practical concern is that changes to control-sy...
Analyst context for executives and security teams
DET0776 is a detection strategy entry for identifying ICS behavior related to Modify Parameter (T0836). The practical concern is that changes to control-system parameters can alter how industrial devices behave, such as how long or how intensely an action is performed. For executives and security leaders, the decision value is not whether this entry provides a ready-made analytic—it does not—but whether the organization can prove it can see, review, and investigate parameter changes that may affect operational safety, uptime, or process integrity.
Executive priority
Treat this as an OT visibility and change-control assurance question. Leaders should ask whether parameter changes in industrial control environments are logged, attributable to an operator or system, reviewed against expected change activity, and available to incident responders. Because the ATT&CK entry provides no platform, tactic, or detection logic, priority should be based on local cyber-physical risk: which processes would be materially affected if operating parameters were changed without authorization or outside approved windows.
Technical view
SOC, OT security, and incident response teams should validate coverage around the related ICS technique T0836, Modify Parameter. Since the official detection strategy has no supplied detection text, teams should not treat DET0776 as a complete analytic. Instead, use it as a coverage requirement: confirm whether engineering workstations, control applications, controllers, historians, asset management systems, and change-management records can provide evidence of parameter modification events where those sources exist in the local environment. Detection design should focus on distinguishing expected engineering or operations activity from unauthorized, unexpected, or unsafe parameter changes.
Likely telemetry
- ICS engineering workstation activity and project/change records where available
- Controller or control-system device configuration and parameter change logs where available
- Historian, process event, or operational data showing parameter value changes
- Authentication and session records for users or systems making control changes
- Maintenance windows, work orders, and change-management approvals for correlation
Detection direction
- Validate that parameter changes can be tied to an identity, host, asset, time, and affected process variable or device where the environment supports it.
- Correlate parameter modifications with approved maintenance windows, engineering activity, and work orders to reduce false positives.
- Prioritize alerting for changes to parameters governing high-consequence processes, safety-relevant operations, or critical production dependencies.
- Look for changes made from unusual hosts, accounts, sessions, or times compared with normal OT operations.
- Document blind spots where controllers, engineering tools, or legacy ICS assets do not produce usable logs.
Mitigation priorities
- Establish or validate formal change control for ICS parameter modifications, especially for critical processes.
- Limit who can modify control parameters through role-based access and operational approval workflows where supported.
- Maintain an authoritative record of expected parameter values and approved changes for comparison during investigations.
- Ensure OT monitoring, logging, and retention are sufficient to reconstruct parameter changes after an incident.
- Periodically review high-risk parameter changes with operations, engineering, safety, and security stakeholders.
Analyst notes and limits
The supplied ATT&CK object is a detection strategy for ICS ATT&CK and is related to technique T0836, Modify Parameter. The related technique description indicates adversaries may modify parameters used to instruct industrial control system devices, and that such parameters can affect how actions are performed. This supports framing the behavior as a cyber-physical and operational resilience concern, but the object itself does not provide detection logic, platforms, tactics, or implementation detail.
The official description and official detection fields are not provided, and platforms and tactics are not specified. Any concrete analytic, threshold, product mapping, or claim of coverage requires local OT architecture, asset inventory, logging capability, and process-context validation. No active exploitation, attribution, or customer exposure is implied by the supplied fields.
Detection of Modify Parameter
No official description is available in the imported ATT&CK source object.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| ICS | T0836 | Modify Parameter | This object detects Modify Parameter. |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 05bc9c0b8d5a… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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mitre-attack DET0776Open source URL
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