DET0766: Detection of Project File Infection
DET0766 is an ICS ATT&CK detection strategy for identifying Project File Infection, where malicious code or configuration changes may be embedded in engine...
Analyst context for executives and security teams
DET0766 is an ICS ATT&CK detection strategy for identifying Project File Infection, where malicious code or configuration changes may be embedded in engineering project files used for PLC programs. For leaders, the practical risk is that trusted engineering artifacts can become a path into operational technology, potentially affecting how control logic is downloaded, maintained, and trusted.
Executive priority
Treat this as a control-integrity and change-governance issue, not just a malware alerting problem. Security and operations leaders should ask whether PLC project files are version-controlled, reviewed, backed up, and monitored before being used in an operating environment. The business decision value is strongest for operational resilience, incident response readiness, compliance evidence around change management, and cyber-physical risk reduction.
Technical view
The supplied ATT&CK object has no official detection text, platforms, or tactics, but it explicitly detects ICS technique T0873: Project File Infection. SOC, OT security, and IR teams should validate whether they can compare engineering project files against known-good baselines, identify unexpected changes to program organization units, tags, documentation, objects, or configuration content, and correlate those changes with engineering workstation activity and PLC download events where such telemetry exists.
Likely telemetry
- Engineering workstation file activity for PLC project files
- Project/version control history and change approvals
- Known-good project file baselines and hashes
- Engineering software logs, if available
- PLC program download or transfer records, if available
Detection direction
- Validate that project file integrity monitoring exists for engineering artifacts, not only for runtime PLC behavior.
- Compare current project files to approved baselines and investigate unexpected changes to logic objects, variables/tags, documentation, or configuration elements.
- Correlate project file modifications with authorized change windows, named engineering users, and any subsequent download to PLCs.
- Tune for legitimate engineering change activity to reduce false positives; unauthorized, out-of-window, or unexplained changes should receive higher priority.
- Document blind spots where engineering software, project repositories, or PLC download activity are not centrally logged.
Mitigation priorities
- Establish authoritative baselines and backups for PLC project files and associated configuration artifacts.
- Require change approval, peer review, and traceability before project files are used to update operational PLCs.
- Restrict and monitor access to engineering workstations, project repositories, and engineering software functions used to download programs.
- Include project file integrity checks in OT incident response playbooks and recovery procedures.
- Use collected evidence to support audit readiness for configuration management and operational change control.
Analyst notes and limits
This take is based on the detection strategy name, its ATT&CK identifier DET0766, and the relationship stating that it detects T0873 Project File Infection in the ICS domain. Because MITRE provided no official detection text, platforms, or tactics for this object, the guidance focuses on conservative validation themes: project file integrity, engineering change control, and correlation with PLC program download activity where available.
The object does not specify platforms, tactics, detection logic, data sources, or concrete analytics. Local engineering tools, PLC vendor environments, logging capabilities, and change-management practices are required to turn this strategy into deployable detections.
Detection of Project File Infection
No official description is available in the imported ATT&CK source object.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| ICS | T0873 | Project File Infection | This object detects Project File Infection. |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | e855ceb14236… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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mitre-attack DET0766Open source URL
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