DET0732: Detection of Theft of Operational Information
DET0732 is a detection strategy for identifying theft of operational information in ICS environments. The business issue is not just data loss: design docu...
Analyst context for executives and security teams
DET0732 is a detection strategy for identifying theft of operational information in ICS environments. The business issue is not just data loss: design documents, schedules, rotational data, and similar operational artifacts can expose how production environments run and may help an adversary plan future activity. Leaders should treat this as both an information-protection and operational-resilience concern.
Executive priority
Prioritize this where sensitive operational documents or production-environment data are accessible from systems, repositories, remote access paths, or shared storage. Ask whether the organization can prove who accessed, copied, exported, or transmitted operational information, and whether incident responders can quickly determine scope if those artifacts are exposed. This supports continuity planning, audit evidence, insider/third-party risk reviews, and cyber-physical risk governance.
Technical view
The supplied ATT&CK object has no official detection text, tactics, or platforms, so teams should validate coverage around the related ICS technique T0882, Theft of Operational Information. SOC and IR teams should focus on access and movement of operational artifacts such as design documents, schedules, rotational data, and similar production-environment records. Detection engineering should map where these artifacts live, who normally accesses them, and what constitutes unusual access volume, access timing, copying, compression, staging, or outbound transfer.
Likely telemetry
- Identity and authentication logs for users and service accounts accessing operational information
- File, document repository, shared drive, or content management access logs
- Endpoint file creation, read, copy, archive, and removable media events where available
- Remote access, VPN, jump host, or administrative session logs tied to repositories or engineering environments
- Network egress, proxy, firewall, DNS, and data transfer logs that may show movement of operational documents
Detection direction
- Build an inventory of operational-information stores before writing rules; without knowing where the data resides, detection will be incomplete.
- Baseline normal access by role, site, shift, vendor, and maintenance window; alerting only on file access can create high false-positive volume in operational environments.
- Look for unusual access patterns: new users accessing sensitive repositories, access outside expected windows, bulk reads, copying, archiving, or transfers from systems that normally do not export operational data.
- Correlate identity, file access, remote session, and egress telemetry to distinguish legitimate engineering or operations work from suspicious collection and movement.
- Validate visibility gaps explicitly, especially unmanaged shares, legacy repositories, contractor access paths, and systems without reliable audit logging.
Mitigation priorities
- Classify and locate operational information, including design documents, schedules, rotational data, and similar production-environment artifacts.
- Restrict access using least privilege and role-based access appropriate to operational duties.
- Enable and retain audit logging for repositories, file stores, remote access paths, and transfer points that handle operational information.
- Review third-party and remote access permissions for users who can reach operational-information stores.
- Prepare IR playbooks for suspected theft of operational information, including rapid scoping of accessed files, affected accounts, and potential operational exposure.
Analyst notes and limits
This take is based on DET0732 and its relationship to T0882, Theft of Operational Information. The related technique states that adversaries may steal operational information from a production environment as a mission outcome or to inform future operations, including design documents, schedules, rotational data, or similar artifacts.
The official DET0732 object provides no description, detection logic, tactics, platforms, aliases, or labels. The guidance above is therefore derived from the supplied relationship to T0882 and should be validated against the organization’s actual ICS architecture, data locations, access model, and telemetry availability.
Detection of Theft of Operational Information
No official description is available in the imported ATT&CK source object.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| ICS | T0882 | Theft of Operational Information | This object detects Theft of Operational Information. |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | e160ad9b6f03… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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mitre-attack DET0732Open source URL
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