DET0643: Detection of Clipboard Data
DET0643 is a mobile ATT&CK detection strategy for detecting attempts to access clipboard data, related to technique T1414 Clipboard Data. The business sign...
Analyst context for executives and security teams
DET0643 is a mobile ATT&CK detection strategy for detecting attempts to access clipboard data, related to technique T1414 Clipboard Data. The business significance is that mobile clipboards can temporarily contain passwords, tokens, recovery codes, account numbers, or other sensitive data copied between apps. Because the ATT&CK object provides no official detection text and no platform field of its own, teams should treat this as a coverage-validation prompt rather than a ready-made analytic.
Executive priority
Prioritize this where mobile devices are used for privileged access, password-manager workflows, customer data handling, or regulated business processes. Leaders should ask whether mobile security monitoring, app governance, and incident response can identify suspicious clipboard access on Android and iOS environments tied to the related ATT&CK technique. This also matters for audit evidence: the organization may need to prove that sensitive data handling on managed mobile devices is governed, monitored where feasible, and investigated when risky apps are present.
Technical view
SOC and detection teams should validate whether current mobile telemetry can expose app behavior associated with clipboard monitoring or access. The related technique description specifically notes abuse of clipboard manager APIs and mentions Android use of ClipboardManager.OnPrimaryClipChangedListener() to monitor clipboard changes. Because the detection strategy has no official detection logic, teams should map available MDM, mobile threat defense, endpoint, app inventory, and mobile OS logs to the question: can we identify apps that request, observe, or correlate with clipboard activity, especially around credential workflows? For iOS, the relationship supports the platform but no detection details are supplied here, so local telemetry capabilities must drive the approach.
Likely telemetry
- Mobile device management inventory and compliance state
- Mobile threat defense or mobile EDR app-behavior alerts
- Installed application inventory and application reputation/risk metadata
- Mobile OS version and security posture data
- Android app/API behavior telemetry where available, including clipboard-related behavior
Detection direction
- Do not assume coverage from the ATT&CK entry alone; DET0643 provides no official detection content.
- Validate whether mobile controls can observe clipboard-related application behavior, not just device enrollment status.
- Correlate suspicious mobile app behavior with credential-copy workflows, password-manager usage, or privileged login events to improve triage value.
- Review blind spots for unmanaged/BYOD devices, older mobile OS versions, privacy-limited telemetry, and apps outside approved app stores.
- Tune for context: legitimate productivity, password-manager, and enterprise apps may interact with clipboard data, so detections should consider app trust, device posture, user role, and timing.
Mitigation priorities
- Start with mobile asset and app governance: know which Android and iOS devices and apps are in scope for business data handling.
- Restrict or review high-risk applications through approved app-store, MDM, or mobile application management controls where available.
- Prioritize stronger controls for users handling privileged credentials or regulated data on mobile devices.
- Reduce reliance on copying sensitive secrets where feasible by using managed credential workflows and enterprise-approved password managers.
- Ensure IR playbooks include mobile evidence collection, app review, credential reset decision points, and user notification paths for suspected clipboard data exposure.
Analyst notes and limits
This take is based on the detection strategy object DET0643 and its relationship to T1414 Clipboard Data. The related technique description supports the risk scenario of malicious apps obtaining sensitive clipboard contents and provides one Android API example. The ATT&CK detection strategy itself does not include official detection logic, tactics, platforms, aliases, or labels.
The supplied object is sparse. Platforms are not specified on DET0643; Android and iOS are only supported through the related T1414 technique. No active exploitation, attribution, prevalence, impact level, or guaranteed detection capability is provided. Local mobile management architecture and telemetry determine whether practical detection is possible.
Detection of Clipboard Data
No official description is available in the imported ATT&CK source object.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mobile | T1414 | Clipboard Data | This object detects Clipboard Data. |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 3bac3d47de46… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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mitre-attack DET0643Open source URL
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