DET0630: Detection of Device Administrator Permissions
DET0630 is a mobile detection strategy focused on identifying Android device administrator permission abuse. This matters because device administrator priv...
Analyst context for executives and security teams
DET0630 is a mobile detection strategy focused on identifying Android device administrator permission abuse. This matters because device administrator privileges can give a malicious app elevated control over a device, including actions that may disrupt access, erase data, disable cameras, or make removal harder. For leaders, the practical question is whether mobile security monitoring can prove when high-risk administrative permissions are granted, changed, or abused on managed Android devices.
Executive priority
Treat this as a mobile resilience and incident-readiness control point. If Android devices are used for business operations, executive communications, field work, or regulated workflows, device administrator abuse can affect continuity, evidence preservation, and response options. Security leaders should ask whether mobile device management, endpoint/mobile telemetry, and SOC processes can identify suspicious administrative permission use and support timely containment decisions.
Technical view
The ATT&CK object itself does not provide official detection logic, platforms, or tactics, but its relationship shows it detects T1626.001, Device Administrator Permissions, in the mobile ATT&CK domain for Android. SOC and detection engineering teams should validate visibility into Android device administrator state, permission grants, app identity, device management status, and security policy changes. Incident responders should be prepared to distinguish legitimate enterprise management activity from unexpected apps obtaining or using device administrator privileges.
Likely telemetry
- Android device administrator permission state and changes
- Mobile device management or enterprise mobility management audit logs
- Installed application inventory and app package metadata
- Device policy changes, including password, camera, wipe, or administrative control settings
- Mobile security/endpoint alerts related to privileged app behavior
Detection direction
- Confirm whether managed Android devices report device administrator permission grants, removals, and active administrator apps.
- Baseline legitimate enterprise management apps so detections can focus on unexpected or newly privileged applications.
- Correlate administrative permission changes with app installation time, app source, user, device ownership, and policy changes.
- Tune carefully to avoid alerting on approved MDM/EMM agents while still identifying unauthorized apps with device administrator control.
- Review gaps for unmanaged Android devices, personally owned devices, or mobile telemetry that is not forwarded to the SOC.
Mitigation priorities
- Maintain an authoritative inventory of approved Android device management applications and expected device administrator permissions.
- Use mobile device management or equivalent controls to restrict or monitor high-risk administrative permissions where appropriate.
- Ensure SOC and incident response teams have access to mobile audit logs needed to investigate permission abuse.
- Define response procedures for devices with unexpected administrator apps, including user notification, containment, evidence preservation, and recovery decisions.
- Include this behavior in compliance and control evidence where mobile administrative control and auditability are required.
Analyst notes and limits
This take is based on DET0630 and its relationship to T1626.001, Device Administrator Permissions. The relationship context supports Android-specific framing, but the detection strategy object itself is sparse and does not include official detection analytics, tactics, or platform fields.
No official description or detection guidance was supplied for DET0630. Recommendations are therefore validation-oriented and must be adapted to the organization’s mobile management architecture, Android fleet scope, logging coverage, and approved administrative applications.
Detection of Device Administrator Permissions
No official description is available in the imported ATT&CK source object.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mobile | T1626.001 | Device Administrator Permissions Sub-technique | This object detects Device Administrator Permissions. |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | aa509ee6b77f… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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[1]
mitre-attack DET0630Open source URL
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