DET0593: Detecting OS Credential Dumping via /proc Filesystem Access on Linux
This detection strategy is about spotting attempts to access Linux process memory through the /proc filesystem in ways associated with OS credential dumpin...
Analyst context for executives and security teams
This detection strategy is about spotting attempts to access Linux process memory through the /proc filesystem in ways associated with OS credential dumping. For security leaders, the practical issue is not the ATT&CK label itself; it is whether Linux systems that may hold credentials, tokens, or privileged process memory have enough visibility to prove suspicious /proc access would be noticed during an incident.
Executive priority
Prioritize this where Linux systems support critical services, privileged administration, identity infrastructure, build systems, or regulated workloads. The business question is whether the organization can produce evidence of credential-access monitoring on Linux, not just endpoint inventory. This is relevant to incident response readiness, audit defensibility, and containment decisions because credential dumping can change the scope of an incident from one host to broader identity and lateral-movement risk.
Technical view
The supplied ATT&CK relationship maps DET0593 to T1003.007, Proc Filesystem, under the credential-access tactic for Linux. Because the detection strategy object has no official detection text or platform field, teams should validate coverage against the related technique: suspicious access to process memory and process mapping artifacts exposed through /proc, especially /proc/<pid>/mem and /proc/<pid>/maps. SOC and detection engineering teams should confirm whether Linux telemetry can show which process or user accessed another process’s /proc entries, whether the access was expected debugging/administration activity, and whether the target process context was sensitive.
Likely telemetry
- Linux audit or endpoint telemetry for file access under /proc, especially process-specific memory and map files
- Process execution telemetry showing the actor process, command line, parent process, user, and privilege context
- User, sudo, or privilege-escalation logs that explain whether access occurred under elevated permissions
- Endpoint security events for cross-process memory inspection or suspicious credential-access behavior where available
- Host inventory and role context to distinguish production servers, administrative hosts, and systems running sensitive services
Detection direction
- Validate that detections are scoped to Linux systems because the related ATT&CK technique is Linux-specific.
- Look for unusual access to /proc/<pid>/mem and /proc/<pid>/maps, especially by processes or users that do not normally perform debugging, monitoring, backup, forensics, or performance profiling.
- Tune for legitimate administrative and observability tools to reduce false positives while preserving alerts for unexpected users, parent processes, destinations, or sensitive target processes.
- Correlate /proc access with privilege changes, unusual shell activity, new binaries, or credential-access follow-on behavior rather than relying on a single file-access event.
- Identify blind spots where file access under /proc is not logged, endpoint agents do not inspect pseudo-filesystems, containers obscure host process visibility, or Linux servers are excluded from managed detection coverage.
Mitigation priorities
- First, inventory Linux systems where process memory exposure would create material credential or operational risk.
- Ensure least-privilege controls and administrative access governance limit who can inspect other processes or use debugging capabilities.
- Harden and monitor privileged access paths, including sudo usage and service accounts on Linux systems.
- Where feasible, configure host auditing or endpoint controls to record relevant /proc access without overwhelming log volume.
- Use incident response playbooks that treat credible /proc credential-dumping signals as potential identity compromise requiring credential review, session/token assessment, and lateral-movement scoping.
Analyst notes and limits
The ATT&CK object supplied is a detection strategy with no official description or detection text, so the take is driven by its name and its relationship to T1003.007 Proc Filesystem. Local validation is required to determine what Linux audit, EDR, or logging mechanisms can actually observe in each environment.
No active exploitation, adversary attribution, detection logic, data source list, or guaranteed coverage is provided in the supplied ATT&CK fields. The object itself has platforms and tactics listed as not specified; Linux and credential-access context come from the related technique only.
Detecting OS Credential Dumping via /proc Filesystem Access on Linux
No official description is available in the imported ATT&CK source object.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1003.007 | Proc Filesystem Sub-technique | This object detects Proc Filesystem. |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 8cae3a6af9e0… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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mitre-attack DET0593Open source URL
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