DET0530: Multi-Event Detection for SMB Admin Share Lateral Movement
DET0530 is a detection strategy for identifying lateral movement that uses SMB and Windows administrative shares. Its business value is in catching the mom...
Analyst context for executives and security teams
DET0530 is a detection strategy for identifying lateral movement that uses SMB and Windows administrative shares. Its business value is in catching the moment a compromised or misused valid account starts reaching across Windows systems, which can turn a single-host incident into a broader containment problem.
Executive priority
Prioritize this as a Windows lateral-movement control validation item. Leaders should ask whether the SOC can correlate account use, SMB access, and administrative-share activity across hosts quickly enough to support containment decisions, credential resets, and evidence for audits or incident reviews. The ATT&CK object does not provide detection logic, so coverage should be proven with local telemetry rather than assumed.
Technical view
The supplied relationship states that this detection strategy detects T1021.002, SMB/Windows Admin Shares, under lateral movement on Windows. Treat DET0530 as a multi-event correlation concept: validate whether detections connect valid-account authentication, SMB interaction with remote shares, and administrative-share access patterns across source host, destination host, and user context. Tune for legitimate administrative activity, but do not suppress privileged tooling so broadly that lateral movement blends into normal operations.
Likely telemetry
- Windows authentication/logon records tied to source host, destination host, and account
- SMB network connection telemetry between Windows systems
- File/share access records, especially administrative-share access
- Endpoint or host inventory context to distinguish servers, workstations, and administrative systems
- Identity context for privileged and service accounts
Detection direction
- Validate correlation across multiple events rather than relying on a single SMB connection or login event.
- Baseline expected administrative-share usage by IT operations, management servers, and service accounts to reduce false positives.
- Look for unusual account-to-host, host-to-host, or time-of-day patterns involving SMB administrative shares.
- Confirm that telemetry includes both authentication and share-access evidence; missing either can create a major blind spot.
- Use the relationship to T1021.002 to align alerts, hunts, and IR playbooks to lateral movement rather than treating the activity as generic file sharing.
Mitigation priorities
- Enforce least privilege for accounts that can access administrative shares.
- Restrict SMB exposure between network segments where business operations do not require it.
- Review and monitor privileged, service, and administrative account usage on Windows systems.
- Ensure logging is enabled and retained for authentication and share-access investigation needs.
- Prepare incident response actions for suspected valid-account lateral movement, including account containment and host scoping.
Analyst notes and limits
This Glexia take is based on the detection strategy name, its external reference DET0530, and the supplied relationship showing it detects T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares. Because the official description and detection fields are not provided, the guidance is framed as validation direction rather than a claim of specific analytic coverage.
The object does not specify platforms, tactics, detection logic, data sources, analytics, or mitigations. Windows and lateral-movement context come from the related T1021.002 technique only. Local environment architecture, logging configuration, administrative practices, and tuning decisions are required to determine actual coverage.
Multi-Event Detection for SMB Admin Share Lateral Movement
No official description is available in the imported ATT&CK source object.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1021.002 | SMB/Windows Admin Shares Sub-technique | This object detects SMB/Windows Admin Shares. |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 6223ad4a3895… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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mitre-attack DET0530Open source URL
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