DET0463: Brute Force Authentication Failures with Multi-Platform Log Correlation
This detection strategy matters because brute-force activity is often visible first as repeated authentication failures spread across more than one control...
Analyst context for executives and security teams
This detection strategy matters because brute-force activity is often visible first as repeated authentication failures spread across more than one control plane or service. For leaders, the decision value is whether the organization can correlate failed logons across identity, cloud, virtualization, and container-related environments quickly enough to distinguish routine user error from credential-access activity that could threaten business operations.
Executive priority
Prioritize this as an identity and operational resilience question: can security teams prove they collect and correlate authentication-failure evidence across the environments where important accounts are used? Because the related ATT&CK technique is Brute Force under credential access, this supports budget and audit discussions around centralized logging, identity monitoring, incident response readiness, and account protection controls. The supplied ATT&CK object does not provide a detailed detection method, so local validation is required before treating this as covered.
Technical view
DET0463 is a detection strategy for authentication failures correlated across multiple platforms and detects ATT&CK T1110 Brute Force. SOC and detection engineering teams should validate whether failed authentication events can be normalized by account, source, destination/service, time window, and environment. Relationship context points to Brute Force activity relevant to Identity Provider, IaaS, Containers, and ESXi platforms, so teams should test correlation across those log sources where present rather than relying on a single system’s lockout or alerting behavior.
Likely telemetry
- Authentication failure logs from identity providers where present
- Cloud/IaaS control-plane authentication events where present
- ESXi or virtualization authentication logs where present
- Container platform authentication or access-control logs where present
- Account identifiers, source IPs, target services, timestamps, and failure reasons
Detection direction
- Validate multi-source correlation for repeated authentication failures by account, source, and target service over practical time windows.
- Tune thresholds to separate normal user password mistakes, expired credentials, service account misconfiguration, and scanner noise from suspicious repeated guessing behavior.
- Look for coverage gaps where identity, IaaS, container, or ESXi authentication logs are not centralized or cannot be joined to the same account identity.
- Correlate failures with subsequent successful authentication to support incident triage, while avoiding assumptions of compromise without local evidence.
- Use the relationship to T1110 to map detections and response playbooks to credential-access investigation workflows.
Mitigation priorities
- First confirm centralized collection and retention of relevant authentication logs across in-scope identity, cloud, virtualization, and container environments.
- Strengthen account protection controls such as lockout or throttling policies, especially for externally reachable or privileged authentication paths, where operationally appropriate.
- Prioritize strong authentication and privileged-account monitoring for accounts that can affect business-critical systems.
- Ensure incident response playbooks define when repeated authentication failures trigger account review, source blocking consideration, credential reset, or broader investigation.
- Use detection validation results as compliance and control evidence rather than assuming coverage from the existence of individual platform logs.
Analyst notes and limits
The object itself has no official description, no official detection text, and no explicit platforms or tactics. The practical interpretation is driven by the name, external reference, and the relationship showing that DET0463 detects T1110 Brute Force, which is a credential-access technique with related platforms including Containers, ESXi, IaaS, and Identity Provider.
Because MITRE did not supply detailed detection logic for this object, this take cannot specify authoritative thresholds, event IDs, platform-specific fields, or guaranteed coverage. Organizations must validate the relevant logs, identity mappings, baselines, and response actions in their own environment.
Brute Force Authentication Failures with Multi-Platform Log Correlation
No official description is available in the imported ATT&CK source object.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1110 | Brute Force | This object detects Brute Force. |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 2d544c09df8f… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
-
[1]
mitre-attack DET0463Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.