DET0410: Detection Strategy for Data from Network Shared Drive
DET0410 is a detection strategy object for behavior related to collecting data from network shared drives. The practical risk is that shared drives often c...
Analyst context for executives and security teams
DET0410 is a detection strategy object for behavior related to collecting data from network shared drives. The practical risk is that shared drives often concentrate sensitive business documents, operational files, and regulated data; if a compromised endpoint can browse those shares, an incident can quickly become a data-loss and business-continuity event before exfiltration occurs.
Executive priority
Treat this as a validation point for whether the organization can see and investigate suspicious access to shared business data from compromised systems. Leaders should ask which file shares contain sensitive or operationally critical data, whether access is least-privilege, and whether SOC and IR teams can reconstruct who accessed what, from which host, and when. This also supports audit and compliance readiness where evidence of access control and monitoring over shared repositories is required.
Technical view
The ATT&CK relationship states that this detection strategy detects T1039, Data from Network Shared Drive, a collection technique affecting Linux, macOS, and Windows environments. Because the detection-strategy object itself has no official description, platforms, tactics, or detection text, teams should anchor validation to the related technique: adversaries may use access from a compromised computer to search host shared directories, network file servers, or other shared drives for files of interest, potentially using interactive command shells or common command functionality such as cmd. SOC teams should validate visibility across endpoint process activity, network share access, file access events, and authentication context so collection from shares can be separated from normal business file usage.
Likely telemetry
- File server or shared-drive access logs showing file open, read, copy, directory listing, and permission events
- Endpoint process execution telemetry from systems accessing network shares, including interactive shell or command-line activity where available
- Authentication and authorization logs for access to network file resources
- Network connection telemetry between endpoints and file servers or shared-drive infrastructure
- File metadata and audit events for unusual volume, breadth, or timing of access to shared directories
Detection direction
- Validate that monitoring covers the file servers and shared-drive technologies that store sensitive or operationally important data, not only endpoint activity.
- Tune detections around unusual access patterns such as broad directory enumeration, large numbers of files read, access outside normal working hours, or access to shares atypical for the user or host.
- Correlate share access with endpoint process context, especially command shells or scripted activity, while accounting for legitimate administrative, backup, indexing, and business automation activity.
- Prioritize correlation with compromised-host indicators, because the related technique describes collection from shares accessible to the current system.
- Check blind spots where file servers lack object-level auditing, where logs record authentication but not file activity, or where cloud/sync gateways obscure the original endpoint or user context.
Mitigation priorities
- Inventory sensitive network shares and confirm ownership, business purpose, and data classification where applicable.
- Enforce least-privilege access to shared drives so compromise of one user or host does not expose broad repositories.
- Enable and retain file access, authentication, and endpoint telemetry needed to reconstruct collection activity during incident response.
- Segment and harden file server infrastructure according to business criticality, and review access from workstations or service accounts that do not require it.
- Establish response playbooks for suspected shared-drive collection, including account containment, host isolation, access review, and preservation of file server logs.
Analyst notes and limits
This take is based on DET0410 and its relationship to T1039, Data from Network Shared Drive. The most defensible use of the object is as a coverage and validation prompt: can the organization observe collection behavior against network shares before exfiltration is confirmed? Local file-share architecture, audit settings, identity model, and data sensitivity determine the actual detection design.
The supplied ATT&CK detection-strategy object has no official description, detection text, tactics, platforms, aliases, or labels. Platforms and tactic context come only from the related T1039 technique. No active exploitation, attribution, impact, or guaranteed detection coverage is stated by the supplied fields.
Detection Strategy for Data from Network Shared Drive
No official description is available in the imported ATT&CK source object.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1039 | Data from Network Shared Drive | This object detects Data from Network Shared Drive. |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | f1490c0c6adf… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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mitre-attack DET0410Open source URL
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