DET0409: Detection Strategy for T1550.002 - Pass the Hash (Windows)
DET0409 is a MITRE detection strategy object for detecting Pass the Hash behavior on Windows, where stolen password hashes may be used for lateral movement...
Analyst context for executives and security teams
DET0409 is a MITRE detection strategy object for detecting Pass the Hash behavior on Windows, where stolen password hashes may be used for lateral movement without needing the cleartext password. For leaders, the practical issue is whether the organization can recognize suspicious use of valid credentials across Windows systems before it becomes broader domain compromise or operational disruption.
Executive priority
Prioritize this as an identity and lateral-movement visibility question: can the SOC prove it collects and correlates Windows authentication activity well enough to distinguish expected administrative access from abnormal credential reuse? This matters for incident containment, privileged access governance, audit evidence around access monitoring, and resilience of Windows-dependent business operations.
Technical view
The supplied ATT&CK object has no official description, detection text, tactics, or platform fields of its own, but it is related to T1550.002 Pass the Hash, which is a Windows lateral-movement technique. SOC and IR teams should validate telemetry and analytic coverage around Windows logon activity, privileged account use, remote access patterns, and unusual authentication relationships between hosts. Detection should focus on defensible environment-specific baselines rather than assuming any single event proves Pass the Hash.
Likely telemetry
- Windows authentication and logon events from endpoints and servers
- Domain controller authentication records
- Privileged account and administrative group activity
- Remote access or lateral movement evidence between Windows hosts
- Endpoint security telemetry showing process, session, or credential-use context where available
Detection direction
- Confirm whether telemetry covers both endpoints and domain controllers involved in Windows authentication paths.
- Correlate account, source host, destination host, logon type, privilege level, and timing to identify abnormal lateral movement patterns.
- Baseline legitimate administrative tools and service-account behavior to reduce false positives.
- Pay particular attention to privileged or high-value accounts because valid credential use can look operationally normal without context.
- Use relationship context from T1550.002 cautiously: the detection strategy object itself provides no official detection logic, so local validation is required.
Mitigation priorities
- Strengthen privileged access management and reduce unnecessary administrative rights on Windows systems.
- Limit lateral movement paths through segmentation and controlled administrative access.
- Improve credential hygiene and monitoring for accounts that can access multiple systems.
- Ensure incident response playbooks include rapid account containment and host isolation decisions for suspected credential-based lateral movement.
- Maintain compliance evidence showing authentication monitoring, privileged access review, and response procedures are operating effectively.
Analyst notes and limits
This take is based on the DET0409 detection strategy metadata and its relationship to T1550.002 Pass the Hash. The object itself does not include official detection guidance, so the most useful action is coverage validation: prove that identity, endpoint, and Windows authentication telemetry can support investigation of suspected hash-based lateral movement.
Official description, detection text, tactics, and platforms are not provided for DET0409. Windows, lateral movement, and Pass the Hash context come from the related T1550.002 technique only. No claims are made about active exploitation, actor attribution, customer exposure, or guaranteed detection coverage.
Detection Strategy for T1550.002 - Pass the Hash (Windows)
No official description is available in the imported ATT&CK source object.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1550.002 | Pass the Hash Sub-technique | This object detects Pass the Hash. |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | f1a3d5d3b35b… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
-
[1]
mitre-attack DET0409Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.