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MITRE ATT&CK® Detection Strategy

DET0076: Behavioral Detection of Visual Basic Execution (VBS/VBA/VBScript)

This detection strategy matters because Visual Basic execution can be a legitimate business function and an execution path adversaries may abuse. For leade...

EnterpriseDET0076Detection StrategyObject v1.0 Modified
Glexia's Take

Analyst context for executives and security teams

Analyst confidence Medium

This detection strategy matters because Visual Basic execution can be a legitimate business function and an execution path adversaries may abuse. For leaders, the key decision is not “do we block all VB,” but whether the organization can distinguish expected VBS/VBA/VBScript activity from suspicious execution patterns quickly enough to support incident response and business continuity.

Executive priority

Prioritize validation where Visual Basic is still present in business workflows, especially environments with Windows dependencies, Office automation, scripts, or legacy applications. Because the supplied ATT&CK detection strategy has no official detection text or platform list, leadership should ask for evidence-based coverage: what VB execution is logged, what is normal, who reviews exceptions, and whether SOC/IR teams can investigate related execution activity tied to ATT&CK T1059.005.

Technical view

This object is a detection strategy for ATT&CK T1059.005, Visual Basic, under the Execution tactic. The related technique notes Visual Basic abuse for execution and its interoperability with Windows technologies such as COM and the Native API, while also indicating .NET Framework and cross-platform .NET Core relevance. SOC and detection teams should validate behavioral analytics around Visual Basic execution rather than relying only on file names or extensions. Since no official detection logic is provided, local baselining and environment-specific telemetry are required.

Likely telemetry

  • Process creation and command-line telemetry for Visual Basic-related interpreters or hosts where collected
  • Script execution logs or script content metadata where available
  • Parent-child process relationships showing what launched Visual Basic activity
  • File creation, modification, and execution metadata for VBS, VBA, VBScript, or related script artifacts
  • User, host, and application context for expected automation or legacy workflows

Detection direction

  • Inventory where Visual Basic execution is legitimate before tuning detections, to reduce false positives from administrative scripts, business macros, and legacy automation.
  • Validate alerts on unusual parent-child process chains, rare users or hosts, unexpected script locations, abnormal execution times, or Visual Basic activity outside approved workflows.
  • Correlate Visual Basic execution with the broader Execution tactic context for T1059.005 rather than treating each script event in isolation.
  • Check for blind spots caused by missing process command lines, disabled script logging, incomplete endpoint coverage, or unmanaged legacy systems.
  • Because MITRE supplied no official detection text for DET0076, treat any rule implementation as locally derived and require testing against known-good business activity.

Mitigation priorities

  • Establish ownership and inventory for approved Visual Basic, VBA, VBS, and VBScript usage.
  • Reduce unnecessary legacy script execution where business owners confirm it is no longer required.
  • Apply least-privilege and change-control practices to users, hosts, and locations that can create or run scripts.
  • Ensure endpoint and SOC logging captures enough execution context to support investigation and audit evidence.
  • Document accepted business exceptions so managed detection and incident response teams can distinguish expected automation from suspicious behavior.
Analyst notes and limits

The strongest use of this object is as a coverage-validation prompt: confirm whether the organization can observe and triage Visual Basic execution associated with T1059.005. Relationship context supports focusing on execution behavior and Visual Basic interoperability, but the detection strategy itself does not provide official analytics, data sources, platforms, or implementation guidance.

Official description, official detection text, tactics, and platforms are not provided for DET0076. Platform context comes only from the related T1059.005 technique, which lists Linux, macOS, and Windows. Local environment evidence is required before making coverage, exposure, or control-effectiveness claims.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Behavioral Detection of Visual Basic Execution (VBS/VBA/VBScript)

No official description is available in the imported ATT&CK source object.

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

1 rows
Domain ID Name Relationship / procedure
Enterprise T1059.005 Visual Basic Sub-technique This object detects Visual Basic.
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
3a93cdd4a00cce58...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
Release Bundle imported Object version Modified Status Raw hash
19.1 1.0 Current bundle 3a93cdd4a00c…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    mitre-attack DET0076
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

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