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MITRE ATT&CK® Detection Strategy

DET0026: Windows Detection Strategy for T1547.012 - Print Processor DLL Persistence

This detection strategy matters because the related ATT&CK technique describes persistence and privilege escalation through Windows print processors: DLLs...

EnterpriseDET0026Detection StrategyObject v1.0 Modified
Glexia's Take

Analyst context for executives and security teams

Analyst confidence Medium

This detection strategy matters because the related ATT&CK technique describes persistence and privilege escalation through Windows print processors: DLLs loaded by the Print Spooler service, spoolsv.exe, during boot. For leaders, the practical issue is whether a normal business service can become a durable startup path for malicious code. The supplied ATT&CK object does not include its own detection logic, so organizations should treat this as a coverage-validation item rather than an assumed detection.

Executive priority

Prioritize this where Windows systems and printing services are important to operations or compliance evidence. Ask whether the security program can prove who is allowed to add print processors, whether changes to that startup path are monitored, and whether incident responders can quickly distinguish approved print infrastructure from suspicious persistence. This supports resilience, audit readiness, and IR decision-making because the behavior can survive reboot and is tied to privilege escalation in the related technique.

Technical view

The object is a Windows detection strategy for T1547.012, Print Processors. The related technique states that adversaries may add print processors that load malicious DLLs through the Print Spooler service during boot, including via the AddPrintProcessor API. SOC and detection teams should validate visibility around spoolsv.exe startup behavior, DLL/module loading by spoolsv.exe, and authorized versus unexpected print processor additions. Because the official detection field is not provided, detection engineering should be based on local baselining and known-good print processor inventory rather than a MITRE-supplied analytic.

Likely telemetry

  • Windows process/service telemetry showing Print Spooler service and spoolsv.exe activity
  • DLL or module-load telemetry for spoolsv.exe, especially during boot or service start
  • Events or audit records for print processor additions or configuration changes where available
  • File creation or modification telemetry for DLLs associated with print processor loading paths where available
  • Administrative activity records tied to accounts capable of adding print processors

Detection direction

  • Baseline expected print processors and DLLs on managed Windows systems, then alert on new or uncommon entries.
  • Correlate spoolsv.exe module loads with boot or service-start timing to identify unexpected DLL loading behavior.
  • Review changes involving AddPrintProcessor-related activity or print processor installation paths where telemetry supports it.
  • Tune out approved print driver and print infrastructure changes through change-control context to reduce false positives.
  • Validate collection gaps: many environments may log service activity but not DLL loads or print processor changes, which can leave this persistence path weakly covered.

Mitigation priorities

  • Inventory systems that rely on Windows Print Spooler and identify where print processor changes are operationally expected.
  • Restrict and review privileges for accounts that can add or modify print processors.
  • Apply change control and approval requirements for print infrastructure modifications.
  • Use integrity monitoring or equivalent validation for DLLs loaded by spoolsv.exe where feasible.
  • Include this behavior in incident response triage for suspected persistence or privilege escalation on Windows systems.
Analyst notes and limits

This take is based on DET0026 and its relationship to T1547.012 Print Processors. The decision value is coverage validation: confirm whether managed detection, IR playbooks, and Windows telemetry can observe print processor-based persistence rather than assuming coverage exists.

The supplied detection strategy has no official description, no official detection text, no tactics, and no platforms on the strategy object itself. Windows, persistence, and privilege-escalation context come from the related ATT&CK technique. Local environment evidence is required to define normal print processor behavior and reliable alert thresholds.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Windows Detection Strategy for T1547.012 - Print Processor DLL Persistence

No official description is available in the imported ATT&CK source object.

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

1 rows
Domain ID Name Relationship / procedure
Enterprise T1547.012 Print Processors Sub-technique This object detects Print Processors.
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
5de816cc47dda8a8...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
Release Bundle imported Object version Modified Status Raw hash
19.1 1.0 Current bundle 5de816cc47dd…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    mitre-attack DET0026
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.