AN1948: Analytic 1948
Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
Analyst context for executives and security teams
AN1948 is a detection analytic for pre-compromise activity where much of the behavior may be common, noisy, or outside the target organization’s visibility. For leaders, the practical point is that this is not a simple “write a rule and alert” problem: coverage may depend on whether the organization can observe earlier or later lifecycle stages, especially Initial Access, and whether the SOC can separate meaningful signals from high-volume benign activity.
Executive priority
Treat this as a coverage and evidence-quality issue rather than a single-control detection gap. Executives and security leaders should ask whether teams know which parts of this activity are actually visible, where false positives would overwhelm response capacity, and what compensating monitoring exists around Initial Access. This matters for SOC readiness, incident decision-making, and audit defensibility because ATT&CK explicitly notes that direct detection may be difficult or outside organizational visibility.
Technical view
The supplied ATT&CK object identifies this as an enterprise detection analytic on the PRE platform, with no specific tactics, relationships, or official detection logic provided. SOC and detection teams should validate visibility boundaries first: what pre-compromise evidence is available, what is owned by internal telemetry versus external intelligence or third parties, and which related Initial Access signals can be monitored as downstream confirmation. Any analytic based on this behavior should be tuned carefully because ATT&CK states the activity may have very high occurrence and a high false-positive rate.
Likely telemetry
- Pre-compromise or external-facing visibility where available
- Threat intelligence or external observation relevant to activity outside the organization’s direct visibility
- Initial Access-related security events used as related lifecycle-stage evidence
- SOC alert and case data needed to measure false-positive volume and triage burden
Detection direction
- Do not assume direct detection is feasible; first document which parts of the behavior are inside versus outside organizational visibility.
- Prioritize correlation with related lifecycle stages, especially Initial Access, as suggested by the ATT&CK description.
- Measure expected alert volume and false-positive rate before production deployment, since the object explicitly warns of high occurrence and high false positives.
- Define what evidence would make an alert actionable, such as corroboration from internal Initial Access telemetry or credible external intelligence.
- Record visibility gaps as detection limitations rather than overstating coverage.
Mitigation priorities
- Establish visibility requirements and ownership for PRE-stage monitoring before investing in alerting at scale.
- Strengthen monitoring and response playbooks for related Initial Access activity as a practical compensating focus.
- Use threat intelligence and external visibility cautiously, with validation criteria and escalation thresholds to reduce noise.
- Maintain documentation of detection assumptions, blind spots, and false-positive handling for SOC governance and compliance evidence.
Analyst notes and limits
This object is sparse: it provides a cautionary analytic note rather than concrete detection logic. Its main decision value is to warn defenders that the activity may be noisy and may occur beyond the target organization’s visibility, so practical coverage likely depends on correlation, lifecycle context, and local telemetry validation.
No official detection logic, tactics, relationships, aliases, or detailed platform telemetry are supplied. The only platform listed is PRE. Local environment evidence is required to determine whether the organization can observe this activity or use related Initial Access monitoring effectively.
Analytic 1948
Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
All related ATT&CK context
No relationships are available in the current normalized data for this object.
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | c14faba33d64… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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[1]
mitre-attack AN1948Open source URL
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