AN1910: Analytic 1910
No standard detection method currently exists for this technique.
Analyst context for executives and security teams
This ATT&CK detection analytic is important mainly because MITRE states that no standard detection method currently exists for the referenced ICS behavior. For leaders, that means coverage should not be assumed from normal SOC tooling or generic ATT&CK mapping. The practical value is to identify a detection gap that may require local engineering, compensating controls, incident response playbooks, and clear documentation of residual risk.
Executive priority
Treat this as a coverage-validation and risk-acceptance item rather than a ready-made detection. Security and operations leaders should ask whether the behavior behind DET0778 is relevant to their ICS environment, whether current monitoring can produce usable evidence, and whether the organization has documented compensating controls and response procedures. This is especially relevant for audit readiness, operational resilience planning, and prioritizing detection engineering work where standard analytics are unavailable.
Technical view
The supplied ATT&CK object provides no platforms, tactics, relationships, or detection logic, and its official description says no standard detection method currently exists. SOC, detection engineering, and IR teams should therefore avoid marking this analytic as implemented based only on ATT&CK coverage. Validation should start by identifying the parent detection strategy or associated technique in the local ATT&CK mapping, then determining what ICS, network, host, application, engineering workstation, controller, or process telemetry exists that could support environment-specific detection or investigation.
Likely telemetry
- Local ICS asset inventory and architecture documentation
- Network monitoring records where available in the ICS environment
- Engineering workstation and server logs where collected
- Controller, historian, HMI, or other operational technology logs where available
- Change management, maintenance, and operational procedure records
Detection direction
- Do not treat AN1910 as a deployable analytic; MITRE provides no standard detection method or detection logic.
- Map the referenced detection strategy or underlying behavior to local ICS assets, data sources, and operational processes before defining coverage.
- Document monitoring gaps explicitly, including assets or network segments where telemetry is unavailable or unsafe to collect.
- Use environment baselining and operator/engineering change context to reduce false positives if local detections are developed.
- Require testing or tabletop validation before claiming SOC coverage, because ATT&CK supplies no platform or tactic-specific detection guidance for this analytic.
Mitigation priorities
- First determine whether the associated behavior is applicable to the organization’s ICS environment.
- Where detection is not standardized, prioritize compensating controls such as segmentation, access governance, change control, and operational approval workflows, as appropriate to the local environment.
- Ensure incident response plans include escalation paths for ICS operations and engineering teams when telemetry is limited.
- Record residual risk and monitoring limitations for compliance, audit, and executive risk review.
- Revisit the ATT&CK object and related detection strategy as MITRE content evolves, since this analytic is version 1.0 and currently sparse.
Analyst notes and limits
This object is a detection analytic in the ICS ATT&CK domain with external ID AN1910. The only substantive official statement is that no standard detection method currently exists for this technique. That makes the main defensive decision point a gap assessment: whether the organization can build local detection or must rely on compensating controls and response readiness.
The supplied fields include no platforms, tactics, relationships, aliases, labels, or official detection logic. No conclusions can be drawn about active exploitation, affected technologies, adversary attribution, expected impact, or existing detection coverage without additional ATT&CK context and local environment evidence.
Analytic 1910
No standard detection method currently exists for this technique.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
All related ATT&CK context
No relationships are available in the current normalized data for this object.
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 94e63a2e1b6f… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
-
[1]
mitre-attack AN1910Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.