AN1834: Analytic 1834
Application vetting services could look for usage of the `READ_PRIVILEGED_PHONE_STATE` Android permission. This could indicate that non-system apps are attempting to access information that they do not have access to.
Analyst context for executives and security teams
This analytic is about using mobile application vetting to flag apps that request privileged phone-state access. For leaders, the practical value is supply-chain and mobile risk governance: can the organization identify apps that request sensitive permissions before they are approved for use? However, the ATT&CK record has an important ambiguity: the platform field lists iOS, while the description references the Android `READ_PRIVILEGED_PHONE_STATE` permission.
Executive priority
Prioritize this as a mobile application governance and compliance-evidence question rather than a standalone SOC alert. Security leaders should ask whether app approval, MDM/UEM review, and mobile risk processes can prove which apps request privileged or sensitive permissions, and whether non-system apps are blocked or escalated for review when they request access inconsistent with business need.
Technical view
The official description supports an app-vetting use case: inspect mobile applications for use of the `READ_PRIVILEGED_PHONE_STATE` Android permission and treat non-system apps requesting it as suspicious or requiring review. No ATT&CK detection logic, tactics, or relationship context was supplied. Because the object lists iOS while the permission is Android-specific, detection engineers should not directly operationalize this without resolving the platform mismatch against local mobile telemetry and ATT&CK source context.
Likely telemetry
- Mobile application manifest and permission metadata from app-vetting pipelines
- MDM/UEM application inventory and approval records
- Mobile app store or enterprise app catalog submission metadata
- Static analysis results for mobile applications
- Exception records showing approved system, vendor, or enterprise-managed apps
Detection direction
- Validate whether app-vetting tooling can extract and report privileged permission requests from submitted mobile apps.
- Treat non-system apps requesting privileged phone-state access as review candidates, not automatically malicious, because the official object provides no detection logic or outcome criteria.
- Tune triage around app origin, system-app status, business justification, and whether the app is enterprise-approved.
- Document the platform inconsistency: the object platform says iOS, but the permission named in the description is Android-specific.
- Use this analytic mainly as a control validation for mobile app governance unless additional local detection strategy context is available.
Mitigation priorities
- Maintain a formal mobile app approval and vetting process for enterprise-managed devices.
- Require review and justification for apps requesting privileged or sensitive permissions.
- Use MDM/UEM or equivalent governance controls to restrict unapproved apps where organizational policy allows.
- Keep evidence of app review decisions for compliance, audit, and incident response readiness.
- Escalate unresolved platform or permission inconsistencies to mobile security engineering before creating production detections.
Analyst notes and limits
This object is sparse: no official detection text, tactics, relationships, aliases, or labels were supplied. The main decision value is validating whether mobile app governance can identify privileged permission requests during vetting.
Confidence is limited because the supplied platform is iOS while the official description references an Android permission. Local mobile platform scope, app inventory, and app-vetting capabilities are required before using this as an operational detection.
Analytic 1834
Application vetting services could look for usage of the `READ_PRIVILEGED_PHONE_STATE` Android permission. This could indicate that non-system apps are attempting to access information that they do not have access to.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
All related ATT&CK context
No relationships are available in the current normalized data for this object.
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 58de26ceebc4… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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mitre-attack AN1834Open source URL
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