AN1833: Analytic 1833
Application vetting services could look for usage of the `READ_PRIVILEGED_PHONE_STATE` Android permission. This could indicate that non-system apps are attempting to access information that they do not have access to.
Analyst context for executives and security teams
This analytic matters because it helps mobile security teams identify Android applications that request the privileged `READ_PRIVILEGED_PHONE_STATE` permission. For a security leader, the decision value is not that the permission exists, but whether application vetting can flag non-system apps asking for access they should not have. That can support safer mobile app approval, BYOD governance, and incident triage when suspicious Android applications appear in the environment.
Executive priority
Prioritize this as a mobile application governance and compliance-evidence control rather than a standalone intrusion detection. Leaders should ask whether Android apps used by the business are vetted before approval, whether permission-risk findings are reviewed, and whether exceptions for privileged permissions are documented. This can help reduce exposure from over-privileged or inappropriate mobile apps, especially where mobile devices handle sensitive communications, identity workflows, or regulated data.
Technical view
For SOC, mobile security, and IR teams, validate whether app-vetting workflows inspect Android manifests or equivalent app metadata for use of `READ_PRIVILEGED_PHONE_STATE`. Because the ATT&CK object specifies Android and does not provide tactics, detection logic, or relationships, teams should treat this as a static application-vetting signal. The key investigation question is whether the requesting app is a legitimate system app or a non-system app attempting to request a privileged permission.
Likely telemetry
- Android application manifest or package metadata collected during app vetting
- Mobile application inventory showing package name, signer, source, and system/non-system status
- MDM/UEM or mobile threat defense records for installed Android applications
- App approval, exception, and review records for mobile governance
- Incident response evidence from suspicious Android app triage
Detection direction
- Confirm app-vetting services parse Android permissions and specifically flag `READ_PRIVILEGED_PHONE_STATE`.
- Tune review workflows to distinguish system apps from non-system apps, since the supplied analytic focuses on non-system apps attempting access they should not have.
- Correlate permission findings with app source, signer, installation scope, and business justification before escalation to reduce false positives.
- Validate visibility gaps: unmanaged Android devices, side-loaded apps, incomplete app inventory, or app stores not covered by vetting can prevent this analytic from being useful.
- Because no official detection logic is provided, document local analytic criteria, severity, and exception handling.
Mitigation priorities
- Maintain an approved mobile app inventory and require vetting before business use where feasible.
- Block, quarantine, or require review for non-system Android apps requesting privileged permissions without a documented business justification.
- Use MDM/UEM or comparable mobile controls to enforce app approval and collect installed-app inventory where supported.
- Create an exception process for legitimate system or vendor-managed apps, including owner, justification, and review date.
- Use findings as evidence for mobile security governance, compliance readiness, and incident response decision-making.
Analyst notes and limits
This is a detection analytic from the ATT&CK mobile domain for Android. The official content is narrow: application vetting services could look for the `READ_PRIVILEGED_PHONE_STATE` permission because it may indicate non-system apps attempting to access information they should not access. No tactics, aliases, labels, detection text, or relationship context were supplied.
This take is limited to the supplied ATT&CK fields and external reference. It does not establish maliciousness, active exploitation, attribution, or guaranteed detectability. Local Android management coverage, app-vetting capability, and the ability to distinguish system from non-system apps determine practical value.
Analytic 1833
Application vetting services could look for usage of the `READ_PRIVILEGED_PHONE_STATE` Android permission. This could indicate that non-system apps are attempting to access information that they do not have access to.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
All related ATT&CK context
No relationships are available in the current normalized data for this object.
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | d725f0003517… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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[1]
mitre-attack AN1833Open source URL
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