AN1706: Analytic 1706

Defender observes an app (package/UID) repeatedly retrieving network interface configuration attributes (local IP/MAC/interface names, active network capabilities, link properties, proxy/DNS settings, or carrier identifiers when permitted) in a short time window, without corresponding user network-management activity. The pattern is characterized by OS API execution for interface/config reads combined with background state, permission/role context (e.g., device owner/profile owner/carrier/default-SMS), and optional follow-on connectivity tests (gateway/DNS/proxy reachability). Correlate across API execution + app state + (optional) local probe to identify automated network configuration discovery rather than routine connectivity checks.

MobileAN1706AnalyticObject v1.1 Modified May 12, 2026, 16:30 UTC (UTC+00:00)

This analytic is about spotting Android apps that repeatedly read network configuration details in the background, such as local IP, MAC or interface names, DNS, proxy, link properties, carrier identifiers, or active network capabilities. For leaders, the value is not simply that an app queried the network state; it is whether the organization can distinguish normal connectivity checks from automated discovery behavior that may indicate an app is mapping the local network environment without a clear user-driven reason.

Executive priority

Prioritize this where Android devices are part of managed mobility, privileged mobile workflows, regulated operations, or environments where mobile devices can bridge business, cloud, Wi-Fi, carrier, and physical operations. Security leaders should ask whether mobile telemetry can show which app or UID accessed network configuration data, whether the app was in the foreground or background, and whether privileged roles such as device owner, profile owner, carrier, or default SMS context are understood. This can support incident triage, mobile policy validation, and compliance evidence around monitoring of managed Android endpoints.

Technical view

SOC and detection teams should validate whether Android telemetry can correlate package or UID activity with repeated OS API reads of interface and configuration attributes over a short time window, app foreground/background state, permission and role context, and optional follow-on local connectivity tests such as gateway, DNS, or proxy reachability. Because no ATT&CK tactic or relationship context is supplied, treat this as a behavior-focused mobile detection analytic rather than a complete threat scenario.

Likely telemetry

Android app package and UID activity records
OS API execution or audit events for network interface and configuration reads
App foreground/background state and timing
Permission, device owner, profile owner, carrier, or default-SMS role context where available
Network configuration attributes accessed, such as local IP, MAC/interface names, link properties, DNS, proxy, active network capabilities, or permitted carrier identifiers

Detection direction

Tune for repeated network configuration reads by the same package or UID within a short time window, especially when the app is in the background.
Correlate API access with app role and permission context before escalating; device owner, profile owner, carrier, default-SMS, VPN, troubleshooting, or enterprise management apps may have legitimate reasons to inspect network state.
Reduce false positives by checking for corresponding user network-management activity or expected connectivity diagnostics.
Increase confidence when repeated configuration reads are followed by local reachability tests to gateway, DNS, or proxy services.
Identify blind spots where mobile EDR, MDM, or OS audit sources cannot expose API-level access, app state, or role context.

Mitigation priorities

Establish baseline visibility for managed Android devices before relying on this analytic for SOC decisions.
Review which apps hold privileged roles or permissions that allow broader network or carrier-related visibility.
Limit privileged mobile roles to approved business apps and document expected network-management behavior.
Use mobile device management or enterprise policy controls to govern unapproved apps and background behavior where supported.
Feed validated detections into incident response playbooks so analysts can compare app behavior, user activity, permissions, and recent configuration changes.

Analyst notes and limits

The supplied ATT&CK object is a detection analytic for Android and provides a behavioral description but no separate official detection field, tactics, or relationship context. The strongest use is as a validation checklist for mobile telemetry and detection engineering rather than as a standalone alert rule.

No active exploitation, actor attribution, malware association, impact, or ATT&CK tactic is supplied. Local Android versions, MDM/EDR capabilities, app permissions, and enterprise mobility architecture will determine whether the required telemetry is available and how noisy this behavior is.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Analytic 1706

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

No relationships are available in the current normalized data for this object.

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .

ATT&CK release: 19.1
Object version: 1.1
Created: Oct 21, 2025, 15:10 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Modified: May 12, 2026, 16:30 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Raw hash: be2d16a8d46014c8...

Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)

Release	Bundle imported	Object version	Modified	Status	Raw hash
19.1	May 18, 2026, 07:08 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.1	May 12, 2026, 16:30 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Current bundle	`be2d16a8d460…`

Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

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Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

[1]
mitre-attack AN1706
Open source URL

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