AN1632: Analytic 1632
Detects unauthorized invocation of replication operations (DCSync) via Directory Replication Service (DRS), often executed by threat actors using Mimikatz or similar tools from non-DC endpoints.
Analyst context for executives and security teams
AN1632 matters because unauthorized Directory Replication Service activity, commonly called DCSync, can indicate that a Windows domain replication capability is being invoked from a system that should not act like a domain controller. For leaders, this is an identity-risk signal: if replication privileges are misused, the incident may require rapid Active Directory containment and credential-protection decisions.
Executive priority
Treat this analytic as a high-value identity security validation item, especially for organizations that depend on Windows Active Directory for business continuity. Executives should ask whether the SOC can distinguish legitimate domain controller replication from replication attempts initiated by non-DC endpoints, and whether incident responders have a tested process for handling suspected misuse of directory replication privileges.
Technical view
The supplied ATT&CK object describes detection of unauthorized DCSync-style replication operations via Directory Replication Service, often from non-DC Windows endpoints. SOC and detection engineering teams should validate whether telemetry can show which host initiated replication activity, whether that host is an expected domain controller, and which account or security context was used. No official detection logic is provided, so local engineering must define the exact signals, filters, and allowlists.
Likely telemetry
- Directory Replication Service activity observable from domain controllers
- Windows authentication and authorization records associated with replication requests
- Endpoint telemetry from non-DC Windows systems that may show tools or processes initiating directory replication behavior
- Asset inventory or domain controller allowlist to distinguish DCs from non-DC endpoints
- Identity and privilege data showing which accounts are authorized for replication-related operations
Detection direction
- Validate that replication activity can be attributed to a source host and account, not just observed as generic directory service traffic.
- Tune for replication requests from non-DC endpoints while suppressing known, approved domain controller replication paths.
- Use asset inventory quality as a detection dependency; stale or incomplete DC/non-DC classification can create both false positives and blind spots.
- Because the ATT&CK object provides no detection query, event IDs, or data component mapping, require lab validation before treating coverage as proven.
- During triage, prioritize whether the initiating account is expected to hold replication privileges and whether the source endpoint is part of normal directory administration workflows.
Mitigation priorities
- Limit and regularly review accounts and groups with directory replication privileges.
- Maintain a reliable inventory of domain controllers and approved administrative systems so abnormal replication sources can be identified.
- Harden and monitor privileged identity workflows tied to Active Directory administration.
- Prepare incident response steps for suspected replication privilege misuse, including credential-risk assessment and containment decision points.
- Use this analytic as compliance evidence only after documenting telemetry sources, detection logic, tuning assumptions, and response procedures.
Analyst notes and limits
This is a detection analytic object, not a full ATT&CK technique entry. Its value is strongest for identity defense, managed detection validation, and IR readiness around Windows directory replication abuse. The relationship context is empty, so no related techniques, groups, software, or campaigns should be inferred from this object alone.
Official detection content, tactics, relationships, aliases, and labels were not supplied. The object supports Windows platform context and DCSync/DRS behavior only. Local environment evidence is required to determine normal replication sources, authorized accounts, telemetry availability, false-positive patterns, and operational severity.
Analytic 1632
Detects unauthorized invocation of replication operations (DCSync) via Directory Replication Service (DRS), often executed by threat actors using Mimikatz or similar tools from non-DC endpoints.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
All related ATT&CK context
No relationships are available in the current normalized data for this object.
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | faff0c30faf5… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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mitre-attack AN1632Open source URL
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