AN1584: Analytic 1584
Use of bash scripts or interactive shells to issue sequential ping, arp, or traceroute commands to map remote hosts.
Analyst context for executives and security teams
This analytic describes Linux activity where a bash script or interactive shell runs repeated ping, arp, or traceroute commands to map reachable remote hosts. For leaders, the value is not the individual network utility—it is whether the organization can distinguish normal troubleshooting from host discovery that may precede broader intrusion activity.
Executive priority
Prioritize this as a visibility and response-readiness question for Linux environments. Security leaders should ask whether SOC teams can see command-line network discovery from servers and workstations, whether administrative use is baselined, and whether incident responders can quickly determine if sequential host mapping is authorized operations or suspicious reconnaissance. This also supports compliance evidence around endpoint logging, monitoring, and investigation capability.
Technical view
Because the official object is a detection analytic for Linux and provides no detection logic, teams should validate telemetry and analytics around shell-driven execution of ping, arp, and traceroute in sequence or at unusual volume. Tune against legitimate network administration, monitoring, and troubleshooting activity. Since no tactics or relationships are supplied, treat this as a behavior-level detection opportunity rather than a complete ATT&CK technique mapping.
Likely telemetry
- Linux process creation events with command line arguments
- Shell history or terminal session logging where available
- Endpoint detection telemetry for bash and child processes
- Network flow or host firewall logs showing ICMP, ARP-related local network activity, or traceroute-like probing
- Authentication/session context identifying the user, host, and whether the shell was interactive or scripted
Detection direction
- Confirm Linux command-line visibility captures parent-child process context for bash launching ping, arp, or traceroute.
- Look for sequential or repeated use of these utilities across multiple remote hosts, while suppressing known administrative scripts and monitoring tools.
- Correlate process telemetry with user identity, login source, host role, and timing to separate routine troubleshooting from unusual discovery behavior.
- Review blind spots such as servers without endpoint logging, containers or minimal Linux systems with limited telemetry, and environments where shell history is disabled or incomplete.
- Because official detection content is not provided, validate any analytic locally before using it for alerting or compliance evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Establish and document expected administrative use of Linux network diagnostic tools.
- Ensure endpoint and network logging is enabled on Linux systems where business impact would be material.
- Restrict interactive shell access to authorized users and service accounts based on operational need.
- Use least privilege and access review processes to reduce unnecessary shell access on critical Linux hosts.
- Prepare IR triage guidance for determining whether observed host mapping is approved troubleshooting, automation, or suspicious discovery.
Analyst notes and limits
The object is an ATT&CK detection analytic, AN1584, for Linux. It describes bash scripts or interactive shells issuing sequential ping, arp, or traceroute commands to map remote hosts. No official detection logic, tactics, aliases, labels, or relationship context were supplied, so this take focuses on practical validation and telemetry requirements rather than asserting a specific adversary technique or campaign context.
This assessment is limited to the supplied STIX fields, external reference, and the absence of relationships. It does not establish active exploitation, attribution, impact, or guaranteed detection coverage. Local baselines and authorized administrative practices are required to judge suspiciousness.
Analytic 1584
Use of bash scripts or interactive shells to issue sequential ping, arp, or traceroute commands to map remote hosts.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
All related ATT&CK context
No relationships are available in the current normalized data for this object.
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | da8a919e1c16… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
-
[1]
mitre-attack AN1584Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.