AN1526: Analytic 1526
Password guessing attempts against web-based apps (e.g., Dropbox, Google Workspace) reflected in API or sign-in logs
Analyst context for executives and security teams
This analytic points to a common identity risk in SaaS environments: repeated password guessing against web-based applications, visible through API or sign-in logs. For leaders, the value is not just spotting failed logins; it is confirming whether the organization can recognize credential attack pressure against critical SaaS services before it becomes an account takeover or business disruption issue.
Executive priority
Prioritize this as an identity and SaaS monitoring readiness check. Executives and security leaders should ask whether critical SaaS platforms generate accessible sign-in/API logs, whether those logs are retained and monitored centrally, and whether SOC or managed detection teams have clear thresholds and escalation paths for suspicious password guessing. This also supports audit and compliance evidence around identity monitoring, access control oversight, and incident response preparedness.
Technical view
The supplied ATT&CK analytic is limited to SaaS platforms and describes password guessing attempts against web-based applications such as Dropbox or Google Workspace, reflected in API or sign-in logs. SOC and detection engineering teams should validate that SaaS authentication events are collected, normalized, and searchable, especially failed sign-ins, repeated attempts against one account, attempts from unusual sources, and repeated attempts across many accounts. Because no official detection logic is provided, local baselining is required to distinguish malicious guessing from user error, automation, stale credentials, or misconfigured integrations.
Likely telemetry
- SaaS sign-in logs
- SaaS API audit logs
- Authentication failure events
- Account identifiers targeted by repeated failures
- Source IP address or network metadata where available
Detection direction
- Confirm that relevant SaaS sign-in and API logs are actually enabled, retained, and routed to the monitoring platform.
- Develop detections for abnormal volumes or patterns of failed authentication against SaaS accounts, tuned against normal user error and business workflows.
- Look for both single-account repeated guessing and broad low-volume attempts across multiple accounts, where the SaaS logs support that analysis.
- Correlate failed attempts with subsequent successful sign-ins to support account takeover triage, without assuming compromise from failures alone.
- Document blind spots where SaaS products, licensing, retention, or API access prevent complete authentication visibility.
Mitigation priorities
- Ensure critical SaaS applications have authentication and API logging enabled with sufficient retention for investigation.
- Prioritize strong identity controls for SaaS access, including resilient authentication policy, account lockout or throttling where supported, and review of exposed accounts.
- Create SOC runbooks for triaging suspected password guessing, including account validation, user confirmation, and containment decision points.
- Review SaaS administrative configuration and logging access as part of cloud/security consulting or compliance readiness activities.
- Use local incident data and sign-in baselines to tune alert thresholds and reduce false positives from normal failed login behavior.
Analyst notes and limits
ATT&CK provides a detection analytic description but no official detection logic, tactic mapping, or relationship context. Treat this as a coverage validation item for SaaS identity telemetry rather than a complete rule. The business value is strongest where SaaS applications are operationally critical or hold sensitive data.
This take is based only on the supplied STIX fields and external reference for AN1526. No active exploitation, adversary attribution, specific impact, detection performance, or relationship-driven context is provided. Local SaaS platforms, log availability, identity architecture, and business risk determine final prioritization.
Analytic 1526
Password guessing attempts against web-based apps (e.g., Dropbox, Google Workspace) reflected in API or sign-in logs
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
All related ATT&CK context
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Object version and sync metadata
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Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | aaef1fc34ef5… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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mitre-attack AN1526Open source URL
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