AN1507: Analytic 1507
Installation of malicious IIS/Apache/SQL server modules that later execute command-line interpreters or establish outbound connections.
Analyst context for executives and security teams
This analytic matters because server modules can turn trusted infrastructure, such as web or database services, into a launch point for command execution or outbound network activity. For leaders, the key issue is not just malware on a server; it is whether critical Windows-hosted services are monitored well enough to spot when a normally stable service begins spawning command-line interpreters or communicating externally in unusual ways.
Executive priority
Prioritize this as a resilience and incident-readiness question for Windows server workloads that host IIS, Apache, or SQL-related services. Executives should ask whether teams can prove visibility into service-launched processes and outbound connections from critical servers, because gaps here can delay containment decisions, audit evidence collection, and business-impact assessment during an incident.
Technical view
The supplied ATT&CK analytic describes malicious IIS/Apache/SQL server modules that later execute command-line interpreters or establish outbound connections. Because no official detection logic is provided, SOC and detection engineering teams should validate behavior-based coverage around Windows server processes: service or module-hosting processes spawning command interpreters, scripting tools, or other unusual child processes, and server processes initiating unexpected outbound network sessions. Incident responders should be prepared to correlate process lineage, loaded modules where available, service configuration, file changes in server module/plugin locations, and network destinations.
Likely telemetry
- Windows process creation telemetry with parent/child process lineage
- Command-line arguments for processes launched by server services
- Windows service and server application logs for IIS, Apache, and SQL-related services where available
- Module, plugin, extension, or DLL load/change evidence where collected
- Outbound network connection telemetry from Windows servers
Detection direction
- Validate alerts for web or database service processes spawning command-line interpreters or scripting utilities, with tuning for legitimate administrative maintenance activity.
- Baseline normal outbound destinations and ports for critical Windows servers, then review server-initiated external connections that deviate from expected application behavior.
- Correlate process execution with recent module, plugin, extension, service, or configuration changes to reduce noise and support triage.
- Account for blind spots where command-line capture, process lineage, module-load telemetry, or egress logs are not retained.
- Because ATT&CK provides no official detection logic or tactic mapping for this analytic, treat any implementation as environment-specific and test against known-good administrative workflows before production alerting.
Mitigation priorities
- Inventory Windows servers running IIS, Apache, SQL, or similar extensible server software and identify which are business-critical.
- Restrict and monitor who can install or modify server modules, plugins, extensions, services, and related configuration files.
- Ensure high-value servers have process creation, command-line, file-change, and outbound network telemetry available for detection and incident response.
- Apply least-privilege administration and change-control practices for server application directories and service accounts.
- Review outbound egress controls so servers only reach destinations required for their business function.
Analyst notes and limits
This object is a detection analytic, not a full ATT&CK technique. The decision value is in validating whether defenders can see trusted Windows server applications behaving like execution or egress launch points. The reference is limited to AN1507 under DET0547, with no supplied relationships and no official detection implementation.
The supplied object specifies Windows as the platform but does not provide tactics, relationships, detection logic, affected software versions, attribution, or exploitation details. Any tuning, severity, or prioritization must be based on local server roles, business criticality, administrative patterns, and available telemetry.
Analytic 1507
Installation of malicious IIS/Apache/SQL server modules that later execute command-line interpreters or establish outbound connections.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
All related ATT&CK context
No relationships are available in the current normalized data for this object.
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 7c2a3c429806… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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[1]
mitre-attack AN1507Open source URL
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