AN1502: Analytic 1502
Monitor for suspicious use of cloud-native administrative command services (e.g., AWS Systems Manager Run Command, Azure RunCommand, GCP OS Config) to execute code inside VMs. Detect anomalies such as commands/scripts executed by unexpected users, execution outside of maintenance windows, or commands initiated by service accounts not normally tied to administration. Correlate cloud control-plane activity logs with host-level execution (process creation, script execution) to validate if commands materialized inside the guest OS.
Analyst context for executives and security teams
This analytic matters because cloud-native admin command services can execute code inside virtual machines without traditional remote login paths. For leaders, the practical issue is control-plane-to-host visibility: a command may look like an authorized cloud administration action, but still create real execution inside the guest OS. Organizations using IaaS should know whether they can distinguish approved maintenance from unexpected command execution by unusual users, service accounts, or time windows.
Executive priority
Prioritize this as a cloud operations and incident readiness question: can the organization prove who initiated cloud-admin commands, when they ran, and whether they actually executed on the VM? This supports business continuity, audit evidence, privileged access governance, and faster incident decisions when administrative cloud tooling is used outside expected patterns.
Technical view
For SOC, detection engineering, and IR teams, validate correlation between cloud control-plane activity for services such as AWS Systems Manager Run Command, Azure RunCommand, or GCP OS Config and host-level evidence such as process creation or script execution. Focus on anomalies called out by the analytic: unexpected users, commands outside maintenance windows, and service accounts not normally associated with administration. Because no tactic mapping or official detection logic is provided, local baselining and environment-specific allowlists are required.
Likely telemetry
- IaaS cloud control-plane activity logs for administrative command services
- Cloud identity and service account activity associated with command initiation
- VM guest OS process creation events
- Script execution logs or command-line telemetry inside VMs
- Change or maintenance window records for correlation
Detection direction
- Confirm that cloud-admin command invocations are logged with initiator identity, target VM, timestamp, and command metadata where available.
- Correlate cloud control-plane command events with guest OS execution evidence to verify whether the command materialized inside the VM.
- Baseline normal administrative users, service accounts, target systems, and maintenance windows before treating deviations as high confidence.
- Tune for expected automation and patching workflows to reduce false positives.
- Identify blind spots where cloud logs exist but endpoint or guest OS telemetry is missing, or where service account ownership is unclear.
Mitigation priorities
- Establish clear ownership and approved use cases for cloud-native VM command services.
- Restrict administrative command permissions to expected users and service accounts using least privilege.
- Define and enforce maintenance windows or change-management expectations where operationally feasible.
- Maintain VM-level logging sufficient to validate process or script execution resulting from cloud control-plane actions.
- Review service accounts used for administration and remove or rotate unused or poorly governed access.
Analyst notes and limits
The supplied ATT&CK object is a detection analytic for IaaS environments. It provides a strong monitoring concept but no formal detection query, no tactic mapping, and no relationship context. The most useful implementation work is validating cross-plane visibility between cloud administration events and VM guest execution telemetry.
This take is limited to the official fields provided. No active exploitation, adversary attribution, specific ATT&CK technique relationship, or guaranteed detection coverage is implied. Effectiveness depends on the organization’s cloud provider logging, VM telemetry, identity governance, and maintenance-process data.
Analytic 1502
Monitor for suspicious use of cloud-native administrative command services (e.g., AWS Systems Manager Run Command, Azure RunCommand, GCP OS Config) to execute code inside VMs. Detect anomalies such as commands/scripts executed by unexpected users, execution outside of maintenance windows, or commands initiated by service accounts not normally tied to administration. Correlate cloud control-plane activity logs with host-level execution (process creation, script execution) to validate if commands materialized inside the guest OS.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
All related ATT&CK context
No relationships are available in the current normalized data for this object.
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 3f5e229ee624… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
-
[1]
mitre-attack AN1502Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.