AN1341: Analytic 1341
Repeated failed authentication attempts to container APIs, control planes, or login shells across many user names using same password
Analyst context for executives and security teams
This analytic matters because it points to a password-spraying style signal against container environments: many user names failing authentication with the same password against container APIs, control planes, or login shells. For leaders, the value is not just detecting failed logins; it is confirming whether container access paths have enough identity telemetry, alerting, and response ownership to catch early credential attacks before they become control-plane access events.
Executive priority
Prioritize this as a cloud/container security and identity readiness question: can the organization prove it sees authentication failures against container APIs, control planes, and login shells, and can it quickly determine whether the activity is benign administration error or an attempted credential attack? This supports operational resilience, incident triage, and audit evidence around access monitoring for container platforms.
Technical view
SOC and detection teams should validate whether container-platform authentication logs can identify repeated failed attempts across many user names where the attempted password is the same or otherwise correlatable. Because the supplied ATT&CK object provides no tactic mapping, relationship context, or official detection logic, teams should treat AN1341 as a behavioral analytic pattern and tune it against local container API, control-plane, and shell access paths. IR teams should confirm escalation paths for suspicious authentication bursts affecting container infrastructure.
Likely telemetry
- Container API server authentication logs
- Container control-plane authentication and audit logs
- Login shell authentication logs for container-related hosts or services
- Identity provider or access gateway failed-authentication events where they front container access
- Source IP, user name, timestamp, target service, and failure reason fields
Detection direction
- Validate collection coverage for all exposed or administratively reachable container APIs, control planes, and login shells.
- Look for repeated failed authentication attempts across many user names with a shared password pattern when such correlation is available.
- Tune thresholds to reduce noise from misconfigured automation, expired credentials, onboarding scripts, or administrators testing access.
- Ensure alerts preserve enough context to group attempts by source, target, time window, user-name spread, and authentication endpoint.
- Document blind spots where passwords are not logged or cannot be safely inspected; use correlation on usernames, sources, timing, and failure patterns instead.
Mitigation priorities
- Harden authentication paths to container APIs, control planes, and login shells with strong access controls and reduced exposure.
- Prioritize multi-factor or stronger identity controls where available for administrative container access.
- Review account lockout, rate limiting, and throttling policies to limit repeated failed authentication attempts without disrupting operations.
- Maintain clear incident response procedures for suspected credential attacks against container infrastructure.
- Use this analytic as evidence to test whether container security monitoring, identity logging, and SOC triage processes are operational.
Analyst notes and limits
AN1341 is a detection analytic for Containers, not a full ATT&CK technique entry. The official description is narrowly focused on repeated failed authentication attempts to container APIs, control planes, or login shells across many user names using the same password. No official detection text, tactic mapping, aliases, or relationships were supplied, so implementation should be based on local telemetry and access architecture.
The object does not provide detection logic, thresholds, related techniques, threat groups, software, mitigations, or data components. It also does not state active exploitation or impact. Any assessment of exposure, coverage, or risk requires environment-specific evidence from container platforms, identity systems, and authentication logs.
Analytic 1341
Repeated failed authentication attempts to container APIs, control planes, or login shells across many user names using same password
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
All related ATT&CK context
No relationships are available in the current normalized data for this object.
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | b228c0e9dd41… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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[1]
mitre-attack AN1341Open source URL
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