AN1330: Analytic 1330
Internal user account accesses shared links outside org followed by mass file download
Analyst context for executives and security teams
This analytic focuses on a potentially risky Office Suite pattern: an internal user account opens shared links outside the organization and is then associated with mass file downloads. For leaders, the practical issue is not just file access—it is whether the organization can distinguish legitimate collaboration from possible data exposure, account misuse, or uncontrolled sharing at scale.
Executive priority
Prioritize this as a governance and resilience question around collaboration platforms: can security, IT, and risk teams prove who accessed externally shared content, whether downloads were expected, and whether controls limit bulk data movement? This matters for incident decision-making, audit evidence, data protection obligations, and validating whether Office Suite collaboration settings align with business risk tolerance.
Technical view
SOC and detection teams should validate whether Office Suite telemetry can correlate an internal user account accessing externally shared links with subsequent high-volume file download activity. Because ATT&CK provides no official detection logic or tactic mapping for this analytic, teams should define local thresholds for “mass” download behavior, baseline normal collaboration patterns, and account for legitimate business workflows such as migrations, legal discovery, finance reporting, or project handoffs.
Likely telemetry
- Office Suite audit logs for shared link access
- File download events from collaboration or document platforms
- User account identity and session metadata
- External sharing and link-access records
- Time-correlated activity showing access followed by download volume
Detection direction
- Confirm the organization collects Office Suite audit events that show both shared link access and file download activity.
- Build correlation around sequence: internal user account accesses shared links outside the organization, followed by unusually large file download volume.
- Tune thresholds by user role, department, data repository, and known bulk-access workflows to reduce false positives.
- Review blind spots around incomplete audit logging, short log retention, personal devices, unmanaged sessions, and external sharing configurations that do not preserve enough context.
- Use identity and session context to prioritize alerts involving unusual user behavior, unfamiliar access locations, or sensitive repositories, if those fields are available locally.
Mitigation priorities
- Review Office Suite external sharing policies and limit broad or anonymous link access where business requirements allow.
- Require sufficient audit logging and retention for shared link access and file downloads.
- Apply least-privilege access to shared repositories and regularly review stale or overly broad sharing links.
- Use conditional access, strong authentication, and session controls for collaboration platforms where supported by the environment.
- Establish an incident response playbook for suspected bulk download or collaboration-platform data exposure, including evidence preservation and business owner validation.
Analyst notes and limits
This is a detection analytic object, not a technique description. The supplied ATT&CK fields identify the platform as Office Suite and describe the behavior as internal user access to shared links outside the organization followed by mass file download. No tactic, relationship context, or official detection logic was provided, so implementation should be based on local telemetry and business-defined thresholds.
The source object does not provide official detection logic, related techniques, tactics, data components, adversary use, or mitigation references. Any assessment of severity, likelihood, data sensitivity, or exposure requires local Office Suite configuration, identity context, and file-access evidence.
Analytic 1330
Internal user account accesses shared links outside org followed by mass file download
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
All related ATT&CK context
No relationships are available in the current normalized data for this object.
Object version and sync metadata
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Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 7546831de678… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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mitre-attack AN1330Open source URL
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