AN1313: Analytic 1313
Adversaries using WinRM to remotely execute commands, launch child processes, or access WMI. The detection chain includes service use, network activity, remote session logon, and process creation within a short temporal window.
Analyst context for executives and security teams
This analytic matters because WinRM is a legitimate Windows remote administration path that can also support remote command execution. For leaders, the practical issue is not simply whether WinRM exists, but whether the organization can distinguish authorized administration from suspicious remote execution by correlating service use, network activity, remote session logon, and child process creation in a short time window.
Executive priority
Prioritize this as a validation point for Windows remote administration governance and SOC readiness. Ask whether WinRM use is expected, restricted, monitored, and reviewable during incidents. The business value is stronger evidence for incident triage, audit defensibility around administrative access, and faster containment decisions when remote execution is suspected.
Technical view
ATT&CK describes AN1313 as a Windows detection analytic for adversaries using WinRM to remotely execute commands, launch child processes, or access WMI. SOC and detection teams should validate whether they can correlate WinRM-related service and network activity with remote session logons and process creation within a short temporal window. Because no official detection logic is supplied, local implementation must define the event sources, timing window, allowlists, and expected administrator behavior.
Likely telemetry
- Windows service activity related to WinRM
- Network connections associated with WinRM remote management
- Remote session logon events on Windows hosts
- Process creation events, especially child processes spawned during remote sessions
- WMI access or execution evidence where collected
Detection direction
- Validate correlation across service use, network activity, remote logon, and process creation rather than relying on any single event class.
- Baseline approved WinRM administration patterns to reduce false positives from IT operations and management tooling.
- Tune for short-window event chains that show remote session establishment followed by command or child process execution.
- Check blind spots where process creation logging, remote logon visibility, or network telemetry is missing or not centrally collected.
- Because no ATT&CK relationship context or detection pseudocode is supplied, map this analytic to local Windows logging and SIEM fields before treating it as coverage evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Define and document where WinRM is authorized for administration.
- Restrict remote administration access to approved accounts, hosts, and management paths where feasible.
- Ensure Windows endpoints produce the telemetry needed for remote logon, service, network, WMI, and process correlation.
- Review privileged access and administrative tool usage so detections can separate routine operations from unusual activity.
- Use incident response playbooks to investigate correlated WinRM remote execution events quickly and consistently.
Analyst notes and limits
This take is based on the supplied ATT&CK analytic description for AN1313 only. The key decision value is validating whether defenders can correlate multiple Windows telemetry classes around WinRM remote execution behavior and whether normal administrative use is well understood.
The object provides no official detection logic, no tactics, no relationships, and no external context beyond the MITRE reference. Local logging configuration, administrative baselines, and SIEM data quality are required to determine actual detection coverage.
Analytic 1313
Adversaries using WinRM to remotely execute commands, launch child processes, or access WMI. The detection chain includes service use, network activity, remote session logon, and process creation within a short temporal window.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
All related ATT&CK context
No relationships are available in the current normalized data for this object.
Object version and sync metadata
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Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | bcbe84c3b743… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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[1]
mitre-attack AN1313Open source URL
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