AN1268: Analytic 1268
Credential stuffing attempts against Kubernetes API or containerized login shells using stolen or leaked user credentials
Analyst context for executives and security teams
This analytic is about repeated use of stolen or leaked credentials against Kubernetes APIs or login shells in containerized environments. For leaders, the issue is not just failed logins; it is whether compromised identities could give an attacker a foothold into systems that run applications and business services.
Executive priority
Treat this as a container and identity-control validation item. Security leaders should ask whether Kubernetes and container login authentication is logged, reviewed, rate-limited where possible, and tied to incident response procedures for suspected credential compromise. It also supports audit and resilience discussions around privileged access, credential hygiene, and evidence that container platform access is monitored.
Technical view
ATT&CK provides no official detection logic for AN1268, so SOC and detection teams should validate coverage around authentication attempts to Kubernetes API endpoints and containerized login shells. Focus on abnormal failed-login volume, repeated attempts across accounts, use of known-invalid or disabled accounts, unusual source locations, and successful authentication following repeated failures. Tune carefully for administrative automation, scanners, and misconfigured clients that may create benign authentication noise.
Likely telemetry
- Kubernetes API server authentication and audit logs
- Container platform access logs
- Shell or interactive login authentication logs from containerized environments where available
- Identity provider or access gateway authentication logs where Kubernetes or container access is federated
- Network metadata for sources connecting to Kubernetes API endpoints or container login services
Detection direction
- Confirm that Kubernetes API authentication failures and successes are retained with user, source, timestamp, and outcome fields.
- Correlate repeated failed attempts with later successful access by the same account or from the same source.
- Baseline expected automation and administrative access patterns to reduce false positives.
- Check for blind spots where container login shells exist but are not centrally logged.
- Because no ATT&CK detection text or relationships are supplied, treat this as a coverage-validation prompt rather than a complete analytic.
Mitigation priorities
- Prioritize strong authentication and credential hygiene for Kubernetes and container access paths.
- Limit exposed access to Kubernetes APIs and container login services to required users and networks.
- Apply least privilege so a compromised user credential does not automatically create broad container-platform access.
- Use rate limiting, lockout, or alerting controls where appropriate and operationally safe.
- Ensure incident response playbooks include credential reset, token/session revocation, and review of container-platform activity after suspected credential stuffing.
Analyst notes and limits
The supplied ATT&CK object is a detection analytic for Containers with a narrow description: credential stuffing against Kubernetes API or containerized login shells using stolen or leaked user credentials. No tactics, relationships, or official detection procedure were provided, so local environment architecture determines the best implementation.
This take is based only on the provided STIX fields and external reference for AN1268. It does not establish active exploitation, actor attribution, impact, or guaranteed detection coverage. Validation requires local logs, identity architecture, Kubernetes exposure, and container access patterns.
Analytic 1268
Credential stuffing attempts against Kubernetes API or containerized login shells using stolen or leaked user credentials
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
All related ATT&CK context
No relationships are available in the current normalized data for this object.
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 79691359ee20… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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[1]
mitre-attack AN1268Open source URL
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