AN1262: Analytic 1262
Multiple failed authentication attempts using distinct username/password pairs from a single IP address or session within a short time window, targeting common services like RDP or SMB
Analyst context for executives and security teams
AN1262 describes a Windows-focused detection analytic for spotting many failed logons from one IP address or session, using different username/password pairs against services such as RDP or SMB. For leaders, the practical value is early visibility into password-guessing or credential-testing pressure before it becomes an access or service-availability incident. Its usefulness depends less on the analytic name and more on whether authentication logs, source IP/session context, and service details are collected consistently enough to separate hostile bursts from user error or approved testing.
Executive priority
Prioritize this analytic where RDP, SMB, or other Windows authentication surfaces are material to business operations. It supports identity security, SOC readiness, incident triage, and compliance evidence by showing whether the organization can identify abnormal failed-authentication patterns quickly. Key leadership questions: Are failed logons centrally collected? Can teams tie attempts to a source IP or session? Are exposed or sensitive Windows services monitored? Is there an escalation path when repeated failures suggest credential attack activity?
Technical view
SOC and detection teams should validate that Windows authentication events include failed logon status, target username, source IP or session identifier, timestamp, and service context such as RDP or SMB where available. The analytic logic should look for multiple failed authentication attempts using distinct username/password pairs from a single IP address or session within a short time window. Because no official detection logic or ATT&CK tactic is supplied, local implementation must define thresholds, time windows, service scope, and suppression rules. IR teams should be prepared to pivot from the triggering IP/session to targeted accounts, affected hosts, authentication services, and any subsequent successful logons.
Likely telemetry
- Windows failed authentication events
- Source IP address or session identifiers associated with logon failures
- Target usernames involved in failed attempts
- Service or protocol context for RDP, SMB, or other common Windows authentication services
- Timestamps sufficient for short-window correlation
Detection direction
- Confirm the environment collects failed logon events from Windows systems where RDP or SMB authentication is relevant.
- Tune thresholds for distinct username/password-pair failures from a single IP or session within a short period; thresholds should reflect normal helpdesk activity, vulnerability scanning, password audits, and administrative testing.
- Correlate failed bursts with any later successful authentication from the same source or against the same accounts to support incident triage.
- Watch for blind spots where network address translation, proxies, jump hosts, VPN concentrators, or incomplete host logging obscure the true source.
- Avoid treating volume alone as conclusive; require enough context to distinguish mistyped credentials, service misconfiguration, scheduled jobs, or authorized testing from suspicious authentication behavior.
Mitigation priorities
- Ensure Windows authentication logs for relevant services are enabled, retained, and forwarded to the SOC or logging platform.
- Reduce unnecessary exposure of RDP, SMB, and other Windows authentication services, especially from untrusted networks.
- Apply identity controls appropriate to the environment, such as account lockout policy, strong password policy, and multifactor authentication where supported.
- Define investigation playbooks for repeated failed-authentication bursts, including account review, source containment decisions, and checks for follow-on successful logons.
- Use detection results as evidence for identity monitoring, incident response readiness, and compliance control validation rather than as a standalone prevention control.
Analyst notes and limits
This take is based only on the supplied ATT&CK analytic fields. The object is a detection analytic, not a technique entry, and no relationship context, tactic mapping, or official detection implementation was provided. The description supports a Windows authentication-monitoring use case focused on repeated failed attempts from one source or session against services such as RDP or SMB.
Local environment evidence is required to define time windows, thresholds, service coverage, and acceptable administrative activity. The supplied fields do not support claims about active exploitation, attribution, prevalence, impact, or guaranteed detection coverage.
Analytic 1262
Multiple failed authentication attempts using distinct username/password pairs from a single IP address or session within a short time window, targeting common services like RDP or SMB
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
All related ATT&CK context
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Object version and sync metadata
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Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 4731be7fb7fd… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
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mitre-attack AN1262Open source URL
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