AN1160: Analytic 1160
Programmatic or excessive access to file shares, SharePoint, or database repositories by users not typically interacting with them. This includes abnormal access by privileged accounts, enumeration of large numbers of files, or downloads of sensitive content in bursts.
Analyst context for executives and security teams
AN1160 highlights abnormal, programmatic, or burst access to shared data repositories such as file shares, SharePoint, or database repositories from users or privileged accounts that do not normally interact with them. For leaders, the value is not the analytic name; it is the reminder that sensitive data exposure often depends on whether the organization can recognize unusual repository access patterns before they become a major business, legal, or operational issue.
Executive priority
Prioritize this as a data-access visibility and governance question: which sensitive repositories matter most, who normally accesses them, and can the SOC prove when access becomes excessive or unusual? This analytic supports decisions around insider-risk monitoring, privileged-account oversight, incident response readiness, audit evidence for sensitive data access, and control investment for repositories that support business continuity or regulated data handling.
Technical view
ATT&CK provides this as a Windows-platform detection analytic with no tactic mapping and no formal detection logic. SOC and detection teams should translate the description into environment-specific baselines: users and privileged accounts that normally access each file share, SharePoint site, or database repository; expected file enumeration and download volumes; and time-based burst thresholds. IR teams should validate whether alerts can distinguish legitimate administrative, backup, migration, indexing, or reporting activity from abnormal access by accounts with no typical interaction history.
Likely telemetry
- File share access logs, including read/list/enumeration and download activity where available
- SharePoint access and download audit records
- Database repository access logs or query/access audit records
- Identity context for users and privileged accounts
- Historical access baselines by user, account type, repository, volume, and time window
Detection direction
- Build baselines around normal repository interaction rather than relying only on static thresholds.
- Validate alerting for privileged accounts accessing repositories they do not typically use.
- Tune for large-scale enumeration, high-volume reads, and burst downloads of sensitive content.
- Suppress or separately model known benign bulk activity such as backups, migrations, indexing, administrative maintenance, or approved reporting jobs.
- Require repository sensitivity and identity context to prioritize alerts; raw volume alone may create noisy results.
Mitigation priorities
- Identify and rank sensitive file shares, SharePoint locations, and database repositories that require monitoring.
- Review least-privilege access, especially for privileged accounts that can reach repositories outside their normal duties.
- Enable and retain audit logging for repository access and downloads where business and compliance requirements warrant it.
- Define approved bulk-access use cases and service accounts so detection teams can tune without losing visibility.
- Prepare IR playbooks for abnormal repository access, including account validation, access revocation decisions, and evidence preservation.
Analyst notes and limits
This object is a detection analytic, not a technique, and it has no supplied relationship context. Its practical strength is as a validation prompt for data-access monitoring: determine whether the organization can see unusual repository access by user, account privilege, volume, and historical behavior.
The official object provides a description but no detection procedure, tactic, relationships, aliases, or labels. Platform is limited to Windows in the supplied fields, although the described repositories may be broader in real environments. Local repository architecture, logging configuration, identity model, and data sensitivity are required to make this actionable.
Analytic 1160
Programmatic or excessive access to file shares, SharePoint, or database repositories by users not typically interacting with them. This includes abnormal access by privileged accounts, enumeration of large numbers of files, or downloads of sensitive content in bursts.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
All related ATT&CK context
No relationships are available in the current normalized data for this object.
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | bc9cbeeca08f… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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mitre-attack AN1160Open source URL
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