AN1113: Analytic 1113
Detection of automated tools or scripts periodically transmitting data to external destinations using scheduled tasks or background processes.
Analyst context for executives and security teams
AN1113 is a Windows detection analytic concept for spotting automated scripts or tools that repeatedly send data to external destinations through scheduled tasks or background processes. Its business value is in validating whether the organization can see quiet, recurring outbound activity that may otherwise blend into normal system operations and only become visible after data loss, incident escalation, or audit review.
Executive priority
Prioritize this as a coverage validation item for Windows endpoint monitoring and outbound network visibility. Leaders should ask whether SOC and incident response teams can correlate scheduled or background execution with repeated external communications, and whether evidence would be available to support containment decisions, data-handling reviews, and compliance inquiries. Because MITRE provides no concrete detection logic for this analytic, the priority is not to assume coverage but to confirm telemetry, correlation, and response ownership.
Technical view
For Windows environments, validate the ability to correlate recurring execution mechanisms, especially scheduled tasks or other background processes, with periodic outbound connections to external destinations. Detection engineering should focus on patterns over time rather than one-off events: process start frequency, parent-child process context, command-line or script indicators where collected, destination reputation or novelty, and whether the same host/user/process repeatedly communicates externally on a schedule. Since no ATT&CK tactics or relationships are supplied, avoid mapping this analytic to a specific intrusion phase without local evidence.
Likely telemetry
- Windows scheduled task creation, modification, and execution events
- Endpoint process creation telemetry with command line, parent process, user, host, and executable path
- EDR or endpoint security events for background process execution
- Network connection telemetry from endpoints, firewalls, proxies, or network sensors showing outbound destinations and timing
- DNS query logs associated with the host and process or user where available
Detection direction
- Confirm that scheduled task activity can be joined with process and network telemetry at host, user, and time-window level.
- Look for periodic or automated outbound communication patterns rather than isolated connections.
- Tune for expected enterprise automation, software update agents, backup tools, monitoring agents, and administrative scripts to reduce false positives.
- Pay attention to blind spots where command-line logging, script logging, DNS logs, proxy logs, or endpoint-network correlation are incomplete.
- Because the official detection field is not provided, treat this as a detection strategy input requiring local analytic design, baselining, and validation.
Mitigation priorities
- Inventory legitimate scheduled tasks and background automation on Windows systems to establish a defensible baseline.
- Restrict who can create or modify scheduled tasks and background automation mechanisms according to least privilege.
- Maintain endpoint and network logging needed to reconstruct recurring execution and outbound communication.
- Review egress controls and monitoring for unmanaged or unusual external destinations.
- Document expected administrative and business automation so SOC teams can distinguish normal periodic traffic from activity requiring investigation.
Analyst notes and limits
This object is a detection analytic, not a technique, and the supplied ATT&CK fields provide only a high-level description. Its practical value is as a coverage test: can defenders see recurring Windows automation paired with external data transmission? The absence of relationships means no specific ATT&CK technique, tactic, malware, or actor context should be inferred.
Official detection logic, tactics, relationships, aliases, and labels were not supplied. The object only supports Windows platform coverage. Any conclusions about maliciousness, impact, attribution, active exploitation, or guaranteed detection require local telemetry and investigation.
Analytic 1113
Detection of automated tools or scripts periodically transmitting data to external destinations using scheduled tasks or background processes.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
All related ATT&CK context
No relationships are available in the current normalized data for this object.
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 0ed4fe0989a0… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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[1]
mitre-attack AN1113Open source URL
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