AN1057: Analytic 1057
Detects processes performing network enumeration (e.g., port scans, service probing) by correlating process creation, socket connections, and sequential destination IP probing within a time window.
Analyst context for executives and security teams
This analytic matters because internal network enumeration is often the point where an incident shifts from a single compromised Windows host to broader enterprise risk. By correlating process creation, socket connections, and repeated destination probing, defenders can identify systems that may be mapping services or ports across the network. For leaders, the decision value is whether the SOC can see this behavior early enough to contain lateral movement risk before it affects business operations.
Executive priority
Prioritize validating this coverage where Windows endpoints have access to critical business segments, identity infrastructure, administrative networks, or sensitive workloads. The key executive question is not simply whether a tool has a rule, but whether endpoint process telemetry and network connection data are collected, retained, and correlated quickly enough to support containment decisions and audit evidence after an incident.
Technical view
For SOC, detection engineering, and IR teams, AN1057 describes a Windows-focused analytic that correlates process creation with socket connections and sequential destination IP probing over a time window. Teams should validate that they can link a process identity to outbound connection patterns and distinguish expected scanning or management activity from unusual enumeration. Because no ATT&CK tactic or relationship context is supplied, this should be treated as a behavior-level detection analytic rather than evidence of a specific campaign, actor, or technique chain.
Likely telemetry
- Windows process creation events with command line, parent process, user, host, and timestamp context
- Endpoint or host firewall network connection telemetry showing source process and destination IP/port
- Socket connection records or EDR network events tied to process identifiers
- Time-windowed connection summaries showing sequential destination IP probing or service probing patterns
- Asset, user, and network segment context to separate authorized administration from suspicious enumeration
Detection direction
- Validate correlation between process creation and network connections; network-only alerts may lack the process context needed for triage.
- Tune for repeated or sequential destination IP probing within defined time windows, while accounting for legitimate vulnerability scanners, inventory tools, monitoring systems, and administrative scripts.
- Require allowlisting or suppression governance for approved scanners so exceptions do not hide unexpected enumeration from ordinary Windows endpoints.
- Prioritize alerts from workstations, user endpoints, or servers that do not normally perform scanning behavior, especially when probing crosses network segments.
- Test whether telemetry latency and retention are sufficient for incident responders to reconstruct the enumerating process, user, host, and destination pattern.
Mitigation priorities
- Confirm endpoint and network telemetry coverage first; this analytic depends on both process and socket or connection visibility.
- Maintain an inventory of authorized scanning, monitoring, and administration sources to reduce false positives and make unauthorized enumeration stand out.
- Apply network segmentation and least-privilege access so a single Windows host cannot freely enumerate unnecessary internal ranges.
- Use incident response playbooks that treat unexpected enumeration as a containment decision point, including host isolation, credential review, and scoping of probed destinations when warranted.
- Review logging and retention requirements as compliance evidence for detecting and investigating internal reconnaissance behavior.
Analyst notes and limits
The supplied object is a detection analytic, not a full ATT&CK technique entry. It provides a clear behavioral objective—detecting process-driven network enumeration on Windows—but does not include official detection logic, tactics, related techniques, procedures, or mitigations. Local baselines are essential because legitimate security and IT operations can create similar port scan or service probing patterns.
This take is limited to the official STIX fields, external reference, and the absence of relationship context supplied for AN1057. It does not assert active exploitation, threat actor use, specific ATT&CK tactics, non-Windows applicability, or guaranteed detection coverage.
Analytic 1057
Detects processes performing network enumeration (e.g., port scans, service probing) by correlating process creation, socket connections, and sequential destination IP probing within a time window.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
All related ATT&CK context
No relationships are available in the current normalized data for this object.
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | cd1e98e854e9… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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mitre-attack AN1057Open source URL
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