AN0823: Analytic 0823
Detects suspicious DNS/ARP poisoning attempts, unauthorized modifications to registry/network configuration, or abnormal TLS downgrade activity. Correlates changes in system configuration with subsequent unusual network flows or authentication events.
Analyst context for executives and security teams
This analytic matters because it focuses on signs that a Windows host’s network trust path may be manipulated: DNS or ARP poisoning, unauthorized registry or network configuration changes, and abnormal TLS downgrade activity. For leaders, the decision value is whether the organization can prove it would notice changes that could redirect traffic, weaken encrypted communications, or create suspicious authentication patterns before they disrupt operations or undermine incident response confidence.
Executive priority
Prioritize this as a resilience and evidence question: do Windows endpoint, network, DNS, TLS, and authentication logs allow the SOC to connect a configuration change to suspicious follow-on traffic or login activity? This is relevant to business continuity, identity assurance, compliance evidence, and incident decision-making because network trust changes can affect where systems connect, how securely they communicate, and whether authentication activity can be interpreted reliably.
Technical view
For SOC, detection engineering, and IR teams, validate correlation across Windows system configuration changes, registry or network settings, DNS/ARP-related observations, TLS behavior, network flows, and authentication events. Because no ATT&CK tactic or formal detection logic is supplied, treat AN0823 as a detection objective rather than a ready-to-deploy rule. The key engineering question is whether abnormal network behavior after a local configuration change can be distinguished from legitimate administration, troubleshooting, VPN/client changes, or infrastructure updates.
Likely telemetry
- Windows registry change events relevant to network configuration
- Windows network adapter and IP configuration change evidence
- DNS query and response logs or resolver telemetry
- ARP-related network observations where available
- Network flow records before and after configuration changes
Detection direction
- Validate that Windows configuration and registry changes can be time-correlated with subsequent unusual network flows or authentication events.
- Tune for authorized administrative changes, software updates, VPN changes, DHCP changes, network troubleshooting, and certificate or TLS policy changes to reduce false positives.
- Check blind spots where DNS, ARP, TLS, or authentication telemetry is collected in separate tools but not correlated by host identity and timestamp.
- Use baselining to identify abnormal TLS downgrade activity and unusual post-change connection patterns rather than relying on single-event alerts.
- Because the official detection field is not provided, require local rule design, test data, and environment-specific thresholds before treating this as operational coverage.
Mitigation priorities
- Establish change control and monitoring for Windows network and registry configuration that can affect routing, name resolution, or TLS behavior.
- Ensure endpoint, DNS, network flow, TLS, and authentication telemetry are retained and joinable for investigation.
- Harden administrative access to network configuration settings and review who can make local or remote changes on Windows systems.
- Create SOC runbooks for investigating configuration-change-to-network-anomaly chains, including validation against approved maintenance or support activity.
- Use periodic detection testing to confirm the organization can observe suspicious configuration changes and related network/authentication effects.
Analyst notes and limits
AN0823 is a detection analytic in the enterprise ATT&CK domain for Windows. The supplied description emphasizes correlation of suspicious network trust manipulation indicators with configuration changes and authentication or flow anomalies. No relationships, aliases, tactics, or detailed detection logic were supplied, so the most useful interpretation is as a coverage validation target for Windows endpoint and network telemetry correlation.
This take is limited to the official STIX fields and external reference provided. It does not assert active exploitation, actor attribution, business impact, or existing customer exposure. The object provides no formal detection query, no tactic mapping, and no relationship context, so implementation details and alert fidelity must be determined using local telemetry, architecture, and authorized-change data.
Analytic 0823
Detects suspicious DNS/ARP poisoning attempts, unauthorized modifications to registry/network configuration, or abnormal TLS downgrade activity. Correlates changes in system configuration with subsequent unusual network flows or authentication events.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
All related ATT&CK context
No relationships are available in the current normalized data for this object.
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | e56488df0981… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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[1]
mitre-attack AN0823Open source URL
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