AN0627: Analytic 0627
Detects central router or switch config management tools (e.g., FortiManager, Cisco Prime) triggering device reboots or config pushes using abnormal accounts or IPs.
Analyst context for executives and security teams
This analytic matters because router and switch configuration managers can make high-impact changes across network infrastructure. If a central tool such as a network management platform triggers reboots or configuration pushes from an unusual account or IP address, it may indicate misuse, error, or unauthorized access affecting connectivity and business continuity.
Executive priority
Treat this as a resilience and control-validation priority for network infrastructure. Leaders should ask whether configuration management activity on network devices is attributable to approved administrators, approved management systems, and approved source networks. The business value is in reducing the chance that unauthorized or mistaken config pushes and reboots disrupt operations, weaken segmentation, or create audit gaps around critical infrastructure change control.
Technical view
For Network Devices, SOC and network operations teams should validate whether they can correlate configuration pushes and device reboot events from central management tools with the initiating account, source IP, target device, time, and change context. Because the ATT&CK object provides no official detection logic or related techniques, detection engineering should focus on local baselining: approved management servers, normal administrator accounts, scheduled maintenance windows, and expected change-ticket context.
Likely telemetry
- Network device system logs for reboot events
- Network device configuration change logs
- Network configuration management platform audit logs
- Authentication and administrator activity logs for management tools
- Source IP and session records for device management access
Detection direction
- Build allowlists or baselines for authorized config management systems, service accounts, administrator groups, and management subnets.
- Alert when config pushes or reboots originate from abnormal accounts, abnormal IP addresses, or unexpected management tools.
- Correlate alerts with approved change windows to reduce false positives from legitimate maintenance.
- Tune for shared-account and service-account blind spots, since attribution is weak if management activity is not tied to named users or controlled automation identities.
- Validate log completeness from both the central management tool and the managed routers or switches; one source alone may not prove who initiated the action.
Mitigation priorities
- Restrict network device configuration and reboot privileges to approved management systems and tightly controlled administrator roles.
- Require strong authentication and accountable administrative identities for configuration management platforms.
- Limit management access to dedicated management networks or approved source IP ranges.
- Enforce change-control workflows for reboots and configuration pushes, including maintenance windows and review evidence.
- Regularly review privileged accounts, service accounts, and management platform audit logging to ensure activity is traceable.
Analyst notes and limits
The supplied ATT&CK object is a detection analytic for abnormal central router or switch configuration management activity. It names Network Devices as the platform and describes abnormal accounts or IPs triggering reboots or config pushes, but it does not provide a formal detection query, tactics, labels, or relationship context.
Assessment depends heavily on local network management architecture, logging coverage, identity practices, and change-control data. No active exploitation, actor attribution, impact outcome, or guaranteed detection coverage is supported by the supplied fields.
Analytic 0627
Detects central router or switch config management tools (e.g., FortiManager, Cisco Prime) triggering device reboots or config pushes using abnormal accounts or IPs.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
All related ATT&CK context
No relationships are available in the current normalized data for this object.
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 0da04f37f45d… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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[1]
mitre-attack AN0627Open source URL
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