AN0456: Analytic 0456
Chain: (1) interactive/non-interactive `chage -l`, `grep`/`cat` of PAM config (e.g., `/etc/pam.d/common-password`, `/etc/security/pwquality.conf`); (2) optional reads of `/etc/login.defs`; (3) same user performs account enumeration or password change attempts shortly after. Use auditd `execve` and file read events plus shell history collection.
Analyst context for executives and security teams
AN0456 is a Linux detection analytic focused on a suspicious sequence: a user checks password aging or password policy configuration, optionally reviews login defaults, and then soon after enumerates accounts or attempts password changes. For leaders, the value is not the individual commands themselves—administrators may run them legitimately—but the combination can indicate preparation for identity abuse or account manipulation on Linux systems.
Executive priority
Prioritize this analytic where Linux systems support critical operations, privileged administration, regulated workloads, or shared infrastructure. It helps validate whether the organization can see early identity-policy reconnaissance before account changes occur. The business decision is whether audit logging, shell history, and file-read visibility are sufficient to support incident response, privileged access review, and compliance evidence around Linux account governance.
Technical view
Validate this analytic on Linux using the supplied chain logic: execution of password aging or policy inspection commands, reads of PAM or password-quality configuration files, optional reads of login defaults, followed shortly by account enumeration or password change attempts by the same user. Because no official detection logic is supplied, SOC teams should define local time windows, user correlation, and allowlisting for expected administrative activity. Incident responders should treat matches as context for account-control investigation rather than as standalone proof of compromise.
Likely telemetry
- Linux auditd execve events for relevant command execution
- Linux file read events for PAM, password quality, and login defaults configuration files
- Shell history collection where available and reliable
- User identity context tying command execution and file reads to the same account
- Events showing subsequent account enumeration or password change attempts
Detection direction
- Correlate policy inspection activity with later account enumeration or password change attempts by the same user rather than alerting on single benign commands alone.
- Tune for legitimate system administration, compliance checks, and password-policy troubleshooting to reduce false positives.
- Validate whether auditd captures both command execution and file-read events on in-scope Linux systems.
- Check whether shell history is collected, protected from tampering, and consistently available for both interactive and non-interactive sessions.
- Define a practical “shortly after” correlation window using local administrative patterns and incident response needs.
Mitigation priorities
- Ensure Linux audit policy supports command execution and sensitive configuration file-read visibility for systems where account governance matters.
- Restrict and monitor privileged account management capabilities according to least privilege and operational need.
- Maintain approved administrative procedures for password-policy review and account changes so detections can distinguish expected from unusual behavior.
- Protect and retain relevant logs, including auditd and shell history where used, for investigation and compliance evidence.
- Review PAM, password quality, and login defaults configuration management so unauthorized changes or suspicious review activity can be investigated in context.
Analyst notes and limits
This is a detection analytic object, not a technique description. Its practical value is in correlation: password-policy discovery followed by account-focused activity from the same Linux user. The absence of official detection logic means each environment must define command patterns, file paths, timing, and administrative exceptions locally.
The supplied object has no tactics, no official detection text, and no relationship context. It supports Linux only. It does not by itself establish malicious intent, attribution, impact, or active exploitation. Coverage depends on local auditd configuration, file-read visibility, shell history availability, and identity correlation quality.
Analytic 0456
Chain: (1) interactive/non-interactive `chage -l`, `grep`/`cat` of PAM config (e.g., `/etc/pam.d/common-password`, `/etc/security/pwquality.conf`); (2) optional reads of `/etc/login.defs`; (3) same user performs account enumeration or password change attempts shortly after. Use auditd `execve` and file read events plus shell history collection.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
All related ATT&CK context
No relationships are available in the current normalized data for this object.
Object version and sync metadata
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Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | b9a9f5fb3c9a… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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mitre-attack AN0456Open source URL
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