AN0373: Analytic 0373
File lock acquired via open() + flock() or lockf() on predictable path (e.g., /tmp/.lock123) followed by conditional early exit or divergent process behavior.
Analyst context for executives and security teams
This analytic describes a Linux behavior where a process creates or opens a predictable lock file path, such as under /tmp, applies a file lock with open() plus flock() or lockf(), and then changes behavior or exits early depending on whether the lock is available. For leaders, the value is not attribution; it is operational visibility. This pattern can matter because lock files are often used to prevent duplicate execution, coordinate process state, or gate follow-on behavior, so defenders need to know whether endpoint telemetry can distinguish normal application locking from suspicious process-control logic.
Executive priority
Treat this as a Linux monitoring and response-readiness validation item. Security leaders should ask whether SOC and IR teams can reconstruct process behavior around temporary or predictable lock files, especially when investigating unusual process execution. Because ATT&CK provides no tactic, relationship context, or official detection logic for this analytic, it should not drive standalone risk scoring; it should inform telemetry coverage, Linux endpoint logging priorities, and investigation playbooks.
Technical view
Validate whether Linux endpoint telemetry can show a process opening a predictable lock file path and using flock() or lockf(), followed by early termination or divergent execution behavior. Detection engineering should focus on correlating file path, process identity, parent process, command line where available, syscall or audit evidence where collected, and subsequent process outcome. Normal software commonly uses lock files, so the analytic should be tuned around unusual paths, unexpected process lineage, rare binaries, repeated early exits, or divergence from known baseline behavior.
Likely telemetry
- Linux process creation and termination events
- File open/create activity for predictable lock paths, especially temporary locations such as /tmp
- Syscall or audit telemetry showing flock() or lockf() usage where available
- Parent-child process lineage and command-line metadata where collected
- File path, ownership, permissions, and timestamp metadata for lock files
Detection direction
- Confirm the environment collects Linux telemetry capable of linking file operations, locking calls, and process outcome; process-only logging may be insufficient.
- Baseline legitimate lock-file behavior for common services and applications to reduce false positives.
- Prioritize investigation when predictable lock paths are used by unusual binaries, unexpected parent processes, or processes that exit early after lock failure.
- Avoid treating use of /tmp or file locks as inherently malicious; the ATT&CK object supplies behavior only, not attribution or malicious intent.
- Because no relationship context or official detection text is supplied, validate this analytic locally before operational alerting.
Mitigation priorities
- Improve Linux endpoint visibility first: process, file, and audit/syscall collection where appropriate.
- Harden investigation procedures so responders capture lock-file path, owning process, parent process, and process exit behavior during triage.
- Review application baselines for expected lock-file locations and document legitimate exceptions for SOC tuning.
- Use least-privilege and standard Linux filesystem hygiene for temporary directories where applicable, but do not assume this analytic alone identifies a vulnerability or compromise.
Analyst notes and limits
This is a detection analytic object, not a technique. The supplied ATT&CK fields identify Linux as the only platform and describe file-lock behavior using open() with flock() or lockf() on predictable paths. No tactics, relationships, aliases, labels, or official detection guidance were supplied, so the take is intentionally focused on telemetry validation and cautious detection engineering.
Source data is sparse. There is no official detection text, no mapped tactic, no related technique or software context, and no evidence of active exploitation or attribution. Local baselines are required to separate normal Linux lock-file use from behavior worth investigating.
Analytic 0373
File lock acquired via open() + flock() or lockf() on predictable path (e.g., /tmp/.lock123) followed by conditional early exit or divergent process behavior.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
All related ATT&CK context
No relationships are available in the current normalized data for this object.
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 5515bb799c0b… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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mitre-attack AN0373Open source URL
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