AN0367: Analytic 0367
Detects unusual outbound file transfer behavior using protocols like FTP, SMB, SMTP, or DNS, involving non-standard processes, off-hour activity, or uncommonly high volume.
Analyst context for executives and security teams
This analytic is about spotting Windows systems that appear to be moving files out over common protocols such as FTP, SMB, SMTP, or DNS in ways that are unusual for the environment. Its business value is in helping leaders validate whether outbound data movement would be noticed before it becomes an incident-response, regulatory, or business-continuity problem.
Executive priority
Prioritize this as a coverage-validation item for data loss, incident response readiness, and SOC monitoring quality. Leaders should ask whether the organization can distinguish normal business transfers from unusual off-hour, high-volume, or non-standard-process activity on Windows endpoints. The key decision is not whether this analytic exists, but whether the required endpoint, network, and timing context is actually collected, retained, and reviewed.
Technical view
For SOC and detection engineering teams, validate visibility into outbound file transfer behavior from Windows hosts across FTP, SMB, SMTP, and DNS. The analytic description points to three practical detection dimensions: processes that do not normally perform transfers, activity outside expected business windows, and unusually high transfer volume. Because no official detection logic or ATT&CK tactic mapping is supplied, teams should baseline local behavior before alerting and should test against known approved transfer tools, backup jobs, mail relays, file shares, and administrative workflows.
Likely telemetry
- Windows process execution telemetry with process name, path, parent process, user, and host
- Network connection or flow logs showing destination, protocol, port, byte counts, and timing
- DNS query telemetry, especially volume and frequency by host and process where available
- SMB session or file transfer logs where collected
- Email or SMTP relay logs for outbound volume and sending host context
Detection direction
- Baseline normal outbound transfer behavior by host role, user group, process, protocol, time of day, and volume.
- Tune for non-standard processes initiating FTP, SMB, SMTP, or DNS-based outbound activity from Windows systems.
- Correlate off-hour activity with user, host role, scheduled jobs, and approved maintenance windows to reduce false positives.
- Use volume thresholds carefully; high-volume legitimate transfers, backups, migrations, and reporting jobs can look suspicious without business context.
- Review blind spots where endpoint telemetry lacks process-to-network correlation or where DNS, SMB, SMTP, or FTP logs are not centrally retained.
Mitigation priorities
- Confirm logging coverage first: endpoint process data, network flow data, DNS, SMB, and mail-transfer telemetry should be available for Windows systems in scope.
- Define approved transfer mechanisms, expected processes, and business owners for recurring outbound file movement.
- Apply egress control and segmentation policies where appropriate so unusual outbound transfer paths are constrained and reviewable.
- Maintain allowlists for known business workflows, but require periodic review so exceptions do not become permanent blind spots.
- Include this behavior in incident-response playbooks for suspected data movement, including triage of host, user, destination, protocol, process, timing, and volume.
Analyst notes and limits
The supplied ATT&CK object is a detection analytic, not a technique description. It provides a concise behavior statement but no official detection logic, tactic mapping, data-source list, or relationship context. The strongest use is as a prompt for coverage assessment and detection design around unusual outbound file transfer activity on Windows.
This take is limited to the official fields supplied. No active exploitation, adversary attribution, specific ATT&CK technique relationship, or guaranteed detection coverage is implied. Local baselines, approved business transfer patterns, logging depth, and retention determine whether this analytic is actionable.
Analytic 0367
Detects unusual outbound file transfer behavior using protocols like FTP, SMB, SMTP, or DNS, involving non-standard processes, off-hour activity, or uncommonly high volume.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
All related ATT&CK context
No relationships are available in the current normalized data for this object.
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 72173221fb9f… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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mitre-attack AN0367Open source URL
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