AN0340: Analytic 0340
Creation or modification of Login Items using AppleScript or Service Management Framework. Detection focuses on file creation/modification of `backgrounditems.btm`, new executables in `Contents/Library/LoginItems/`, use of `SMLoginItemSetEnabled` API, or suspicious processes triggered post-login without user interaction. Behavioral pivot includes anomalous AppleEvents, suspicious parent-child process pairs, and login-triggered execution chains.
Analyst context for executives and security teams
This analytic is about detecting macOS persistence risk through creation or modification of Login Items, including changes to backgrounditems.btm, new executables under Contents/Library/LoginItems/, Service Management Framework usage, and login-triggered execution without clear user interaction. For leaders, the value is confirming whether the organization can see and investigate software that silently starts after a user logs in, which matters for endpoint resilience, incident scoping, and audit evidence on macOS fleets.
Executive priority
Prioritize this where macOS systems support business-critical users, privileged administrators, developers, or executives. The decision point is not just whether an EDR product is deployed, but whether SOC and IR teams can prove visibility into login-startup changes, AppleScript or Service Management behavior, and suspicious post-login process chains. This analytic supports control validation for managed detection, endpoint hardening, and incident readiness, but the supplied ATT&CK object does not provide a specific tactic mapping or confirmed detection logic.
Technical view
SOC and detection teams should validate telemetry for macOS file creation/modification involving backgrounditems.btm and Contents/Library/LoginItems/, process execution around user login, parent-child process relationships, AppleEvents activity, and observable use of the SMLoginItemSetEnabled API where available. IR teams should be prepared to pivot from a changed Login Item to the responsible process, user context, executable path, signing/notarization details if locally available, and subsequent post-login execution chain. Because no official detection query is provided, this should be treated as a detection engineering requirement rather than a ready-to-run rule.
Likely telemetry
- macOS file creation and modification events for backgrounditems.btm
- File creation events for executables under Contents/Library/LoginItems/
- Process creation telemetry around user login sessions
- Parent-child process relationship data for login-triggered execution
- AppleEvents-related activity where collected
Detection direction
- Baseline legitimate Login Item creation and modification patterns for managed software to reduce false positives.
- Alert on new or modified Login Item artifacts followed by execution after login without clear user interaction.
- Correlate file changes with initiating process, user, timestamp, and subsequent child processes.
- Review anomalous AppleEvents and suspicious parent-child process pairs as pivots, not as standalone proof of malicious activity.
- Validate whether current macOS telemetry captures the specific artifacts named by the analytic; many environments collect process data but miss persistence file changes or API-level context.
Mitigation priorities
- Ensure macOS endpoint monitoring covers Login Item persistence locations and post-login process execution.
- Harden software installation and change-control practices for applications that create Login Items.
- Limit unnecessary user privileges where feasible so persistence changes are easier to govern and investigate.
- Maintain approved baselines for expected Login Items on managed macOS devices.
- Integrate this validation into incident response playbooks for macOS persistence triage.
Analyst notes and limits
The object is a detection analytic for macOS and specifically names Login Items, AppleScript, Service Management Framework, backgrounditems.btm, Contents/Library/LoginItems/, SMLoginItemSetEnabled, AppleEvents, parent-child process pairs, and login-triggered execution chains. No relationships, tactics, aliases, labels, or official detection query were supplied, so this take focuses on defensive validation and telemetry requirements rather than adversary attribution or technique mapping.
The supplied ATT&CK fields do not include an official detection implementation, mapped tactics, related techniques, procedures, mitigations, or data source objects. Local macOS configuration, EDR capabilities, logging depth, and enterprise software baselines are required to determine actual coverage and alert quality.
Analytic 0340
Creation or modification of Login Items using AppleScript or Service Management Framework. Detection focuses on file creation/modification of `backgrounditems.btm`, new executables in `Contents/Library/LoginItems/`, use of `SMLoginItemSetEnabled` API, or suspicious processes triggered post-login without user interaction. Behavioral pivot includes anomalous AppleEvents, suspicious parent-child process pairs, and login-triggered execution chains.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
All related ATT&CK context
No relationships are available in the current normalized data for this object.
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | b2c5546f3534… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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mitre-attack AN0340Open source URL
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