AN0318: Analytic 0318
Detects enumeration of local groups using common binaries (groups, getent, cat /etc/group) or scripting with suspicious lineage.
Analyst context for executives and security teams
This analytic matters because local group enumeration on Linux is often a decision point in an investigation: it can indicate a user, script, or process is trying to understand local privileges and membership before taking further action. For leaders, the value is not the command names alone, but whether the organization can reliably distinguish normal administration from suspicious discovery activity on Linux systems.
Executive priority
Prioritize this as a validation item for Linux monitoring and incident response readiness. Security leaders should ask whether SOC teams can see local group enumeration, tie it to process lineage, and explain whether the activity came from an administrator, automation, or an unusual parent process. It can also support audit and compliance evidence around endpoint visibility and privileged access oversight, but local baselining is required before it becomes reliable operational coverage.
Technical view
AN0318 is a Linux detection analytic for enumeration of local groups using common binaries such as groups, getent, and cat /etc/group, or scripting with suspicious lineage. SOC and detection engineering teams should validate process execution visibility, command-line capture, parent-child process context, and user/session attribution for Linux hosts. Because no ATT&CK tactic, official detection logic, or relationship context is supplied, implementation should focus on environment-specific baselines and suspicious process lineage rather than treating every use of these commands as malicious.
Likely telemetry
- Linux process execution events
- Command-line arguments
- Parent and child process lineage
- User and group context for the executing process
- Interactive session or remote access context where available
Detection direction
- Confirm that Linux endpoint telemetry captures groups, getent, cat, and access to /etc/group with full command line and parent process information.
- Tune for suspicious lineage, such as enumeration launched by unexpected scripts, service processes, application users, or other non-administrative contexts.
- Baseline legitimate administrative, provisioning, compliance, and inventory activity to reduce false positives.
- Correlate group enumeration with nearby authentication, privilege, shell, or script execution activity where local telemetry supports it.
- Document blind spots where Linux hosts lack process command-line logging or where scripting activity is not attributed to a clear user or parent process.
Mitigation priorities
- Improve Linux endpoint logging coverage before relying on this analytic for alerting.
- Restrict and monitor privileged administrative access using existing identity and access management controls.
- Review service account and automation behavior so expected group enumeration is known and documented.
- Use least-privilege practices to limit the business impact if group information is used to identify privileged paths.
- Include this behavior in incident response triage playbooks as contextual evidence rather than a standalone determination of compromise.
Analyst notes and limits
The supplied object is a detection analytic, not a technique, and has no tactic mapping or relationships provided. Its practical value is highest when used as a supporting signal during Linux host investigation, especially when process lineage or user context is unusual.
Official detection logic is not provided, and no relationship context is supplied. This take is limited to the official fields indicating Linux local group enumeration via common binaries or scripting with suspicious lineage. Local baselines are required to determine what is normal or suspicious.
Analytic 0318
Detects enumeration of local groups using common binaries (groups, getent, cat /etc/group) or scripting with suspicious lineage.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
All related ATT&CK context
No relationships are available in the current normalized data for this object.
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 8ba0d42cd475… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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[1]
mitre-attack AN0318Open source URL
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